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An Economist’s Perspective on 
Financial Capitalism 
J. Bradford De Long 
6.1  Introduction 
The pre-World  War I period saw the heyday of “financial capitalism” in the 
United States: securities issues in particular and the investment banking busi- 
ness in general were concentrated in the hands of a very few investment bank- 
ers-of  which the partnership of J. P.  Morgan and Company was by far the 
largest  and  most  prominent-who  played  substantial  roles  on  corporate 
boards of  directors. This form of association between finance and industry 
had costs: it created conflicts of interest that investment bankers could exploit 
for their own profit. It also had benefits, at least from the owners’ perspective:’ 
investment banker representation on boards allowed bankers to assess the per- 
formance of  firm managers, quickly replace managers whose performance 
was unsatisfactory, and signal to investors that a company was fundamentally 
sound. 
The Morgan-dominated “money trust” thus filled an important monitoring 
role in the years before World War I. In 1910-12  the presence on one’s board 
of directors of a partner in J. P.  Morgan and Company added about 30 percent 
to common stock equity value. The overwhelming proportion of this increase 
in  value came from the fact that Morgan companies performed better than 
others similarly situated. 
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1. As opposed to the workers’ or consumers’ perspective. Some of the increased value came 
from improved productive efficiency. Some came from an increased ability to exercise monopoly 
power. 
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Some share of the increase in value almost surely arose because investment 
banker representation  on the boards of competing companies aided the for- 
mation of oligopoly. But the development of similar institutions in other coun- 
tries that, like the Gilded Age United States, experienced exceptionally rapid 
economic growth-Germany  and Japan are the most prominent examples- 
suggests that a large share of the value added may have arisen because “finan- 
cial  capitalism”  improved  the  functioning  of  financial  markets  as  social 
capital-allocation mechanisms. 
This paper is organized  as follows.  Section 6.2 lays out the major issues 
that arise when taking an economist’s perspective on the turn-of-the-century 
“money trust .” Section 6.3 presents Progressive and finance historian perspec- 
tives and argues that they leave the most interesting questions unaddressed. 
Section 6.4 lays out the money trust’s contemporary view of itself, and inter- 
prets  it  in a way that promises  to resolve  the anomalies pointed  out in sec- 
tion 6.2. Section 6.5 argues that the  money trust’s view of  itself is by  and 
large  supported  by  the available quantitative  evidence.  Section 6.6 consid- 
ers  two  very  brief  case  studies,  International  Harvester  and  AT&T.  Sec- 
tion 6.7  considers extensions and related issues, and section 6.8  offers conclu- 
sions. 
6.2  An Economist’s Perspective on the Money ’hst 
In the years before World War I, a corporate security flotation worth more 
than  $10 million  invariably  passed  through  one  of  a very  few  investment 
banks-J.  P.  Morgan  and  Company; Kuhn, Loeb, and Company; the  First 
National Bank; the National City Bank; Kidder, Peabody, and Company; and 
Lee,  Higginson, and Company.2 The partners and directors of  these institu- 
tions  were directors, voting trustees,  or major stockholders of  corporations 
with  a  total  capitalization-debt  plus  equity-including  subsidiaries,  of 
nearly  $30 billion (Brandeis  1914). In perspective,  this  sum bore the  same 
relation to the size of the U.S. economy then that $7.5 trillion bears today: it 
amounted to one and  a half  years’  national product  and 40  percent  of  the 
country’s produced capital (Goldsmith 1954). 
The investment banking  oligarchs profited  immensely from their middle- 
man role. Typical fees on mergers and restructurings ranged between 4 and 10 
2. When questioned by Samuel Untermyer, chief counsel and guiding spirit of the investigat- 
ing Pujo Committee (chaired by Louisiana representative Arskne Pujo), First National Bank chair- 
man George F. Baker was “unable to name a single issue of as much as $1O,OOO,OOO  . . . that had 
been made within ten years without the participation or cooperation of one of the members” of the 
small  group of  dominant  investment  banks  (Pujo Committee  1913b).  Securities  issues  then 
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percent of the capital value of the businesses in~olved.~  The commissions on 
U.S. Steel were as large a share of the economy then as $15 billion would be 
today. Today Wall Street’s investment banking firms are strained to the limit 
by  deals that are, in proportion to the size of the economy, only one-tenth as 
large. 
Wall Street finance before World War I was thus several orders of magnitude 
more concentrated than it has been at any time since. This concentration of 
finance was a major political flashpoint. Progressives feared this money trust 
in finance as an evil much more dangerous than any monopoly in an individual 
industry. The financial dominance of the money trust allowed it to charge high 
fees and so levy a destructive tax on the productive classes, and the high prof- 
its eamed by  the money trust were distributed to buy influence to keep its 
d~minance.~  Historians of financial markets have exhibited a strong revision- 
ist tendency to reject the Progressive critique: many have argued that, since 
there were few barriers to entry in finance, monopoly power was impossible 
to exercise and that the dominance of Morgan and the other oligarchs should 
be viewed as reflecting their excellence at innovation and as financial entre- 
preneurs. 
Progressives write the history of American finance around the turn of  the 
century as a series of frauds and conflicts of interest (Brandeis 1914; Unter- 
myer 1915; Pecora 1939). Finance historians and biographers tend to write it 
as a series of  individual acts of  entrepreneurial vision: J. P.  Morgan at the 
Morgan partnership (see Hovey  1912; Satterlee 1935; Allen 1949; Chemow 
1990) and Jacob Schiff at Kuhn, Loeb (Adler 1921, 1928) saw the opportunity 
for a certain merger or restructuring or reorganization before anyone else, 
carried it through, and reaped the rewards of ingenuity and enterprise (see also 
Redlich 195  1  ) . 
But from an economist’s standpoint neither .of these ways of  telling the 
story fully captures how it really happened. Ingenuity and enterprise produce 
high profits in the short run, but such high short-run profits then attract imita- 
tors and competitors. The imitators and competitors copy the organizations 
and operating procedures of  the first-moving innovators, and compete away 
the initial high profits. Sustained high profit rates and sustained market domi- 
nance require not only ingenuity and enterprise but also substantial “barriers 
to entry.” Sustained high profits are possible only if there are factors that make 
3. The lower figure comes from the investment banker share of the very straightforward Inter- 
national Harvester merger. The upper  figure comes from the  investment banker  share  of U.S. 
Steel. It  does not include the investment banker share of previous combinations bringing together 
various subparts of the future U.S. Steel. 
4. Many  historians have often been more  approving of the  large financial organizations and 
deals of the Gilded Age. See Chandler (1990). In addition, Gerschenkron (1962) argued that the 
heavy capital requirements of modern technologies required large firms and larger banks. Davis 
(1963, 1966) wondered whether Great Britain’s economic decline might be linked to its failure to 
develop “finance capitalist” institutions. 208  J. Bradford De Long 
it costly for competitors to enter the business, and difficult for competitors to 
match existing firms’ capabilities. 
Yet  neither Progressives nor finance historians have addressed  what  such 
“barriers to entry” were. No one has maintained that Morgan and Company 
and Kuhn, Loeb earned mere “normal” rates of return on their capital in the 
years before World War I. Such high profits should have induced much of the 
potential competition to become actual-or,  at a bare minimum, the threat of 
new  entry  and  subsequent  competition  should  have  induced  Morgan  and 
Company and its peers to moderate their fees-unless  the existing investment 
banking firms had organizational capabilities and competitive advantages that 
new entrants could not effectively match. 
From an economist’s standpoint,  therefore,  the combination of no visible 
barriers to entry, sustained dominance by a tight oligarchy of firms, and ex- 
traordinarily high profit rates is anomalous. On the progressive reading of the 
situation, the Morgan partnership and its peers should have eamed high profits 
in  the  present  while  experiencing  a rapid  erosion of  market  share-as  did 
U.S. Steel,  Morgan’s  dominant  firm  in  the  steel-making  industry,  which 
earned high profits but experienced a very rapid erosion of its market share to 
Bethlehem Steel and others in the years before the Great Depression.  On fi- 
nance historians’ reading, competition between the Morgan partnership,  its 
investment banking peers, and additional potential investment banking com- 
petitors should have kept Morgan and Company from earning sustained super- 
normal profits in the first place. 
Thus the key  to understanding  American  finance  around the  turn of  the 
century is to find an answer to the following question: What were the barriers 
to entry that prevented  new firms from matching the capabilities of  Morgan 
and Company and its peers? There must have been some way that they created 
value for customers that potential competitors could not match. The story of 
American finance at the turn of the century cannot be coherently and com- 
pletely told without detailing the origins and functioning of the Morgan part- 
nership’s competitive advantage. 
This paper tries to specify the source and nature of Morgan and Company’s 
competitive  advantage.  In the process,  it puts  some empirical  meat  on the 
theoretical bones of the relationship between finance and industry. And it tries 
to untangle the question of what the money trust actually was. 
Such a study is of  obvious historical interest. Morgan and Company must 
have had some striking competitive edge in order to maintain its dominance 
over American  finance  at the turn  of the  century:  if  not, such a profitable 
business should have seen the rapid arrival of new competitors to reduce the 
magnitude  of  the wealth  to be earned. The Morgan-headed  “money  trust” 
remained  a  fixed  point  for  more  than  a  generation, while  all  was  in  flux 
around it. 
Such a study could be of direct interest to those concerned with the regula- 
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Company to become the focus of  the tum-of-the-century capital market are 
still at work today. In such a case, how the turn-of-the-century market func- 
tioned carries information about how today’s markets ought to f~nction.~ 
The conclusions reached on the source of  the money trust’s competitive 
advantage are most hospitable to a view of  the relation between finance and 
industry often identified with Lester Thurow (1986). The Morgan partnership 
and its peers saw themselves-and  other participants in the pre-World War I 
securities industry saw them-as  filling a crucial “monitoring” and “signal- 
ing” intermediary role between firms and investors in a world where infor- 
mation about firms’ underlying values and the quality of their managers was 
scarce. In such a world it was valuable for a firm to have the stamp of approval 
from Morgan and Company (with its established reputation) and to have its 
managers watched over by  Morgan’s men from their posts on the board of 
directors. The presence of  Morgan’s men meant that when a firm got into 
trouble-whether  because of  “excessive competition” or management mis- 
takes-action  would be taken to restore profitability. The presence of one of 
Morgan’s men may also have reassured investors that a firm appearing well- 
managed and with bright prospects actually was well-managed and did have 
bright prospects. 
On this interpretation, the structure of information is the key to understand- 
ing tum-of-the-century Wall Street. Individual investors are, essentially, with- 
out reliable information about firms’ prospects and their managers and with- 
out power to adequately monitor and control the executives who manage the 
firms in which they invest. By serving as an honest (albeit expensive) broker, 
a dominant investment bank can channel investors’ funds into and choose ex- 
ecutives to run firms, collect high fees, and yet on net provide value to inves- 
tors. In such a situation, a firm’s reputation as an honest broker becomes a 
very important asset-an  asset that must be safeguarded by actually being an 
honest broker, and an asset that a potential competitor will find it very hard to 
match. 
High concentration in investment banking may have played a role in sup- 
porting “financial capitalism.” A firm with a large market share may reap large 
benefits from a good reputation. If  reputations as honest brokers are suffi- 
ciently fragile, a firm with a large market share will find it most profitable in 
the long run to strive to be above suspicion in every short run: it will not 
imperil its reputation for the sake of higher short-run profits in any one deal 
as long as the finance industry’s future and its own market share appear se- 
cure. 
5. On the other hand, perhaps styles of  management, means of  gathering information, and 
shareholders’ ability to  discipline rogue management have all changed sufficiently that capital 
market institutions that were effective in  1900 would be ineffective today. A look, however, at 
Germany and Japan-which  appear to have kept many “finance capitalist”  institutions throughout 
the  past century-leads  one to  suspect that institutions that were effective in 1900 would still be 
effective in  1990. These issues are briefly touched on in section 6.7. 210  J. Bradford De Long 
By contrast, a firm with a small market share may well decide to “cash in” 
its reputation by  luring investors into a profitable deal that is unsound-as 
Standard Oil magnates H. H. Rogers and William Rockefeller may have done 
with  the Amalgamated Copper Corporation (Lawson  1906). With  a small 
market share, the future returns expected from a reputation as an honest bro- 
ker might also be small, and less than the present benefits from exploiting to 
the fullest one unsound deal. If  investors follow this chain of  reasoning and 
conclude that a firm with a small market share has little incentive to be an 
“honest broker,” such small firms will find themselves unable to compete with 
Morgan and Company or with Kuhn, Loeb, for no one will trust them not to 
sacrifice their long-run reputation for immediate profits. The large market 
share of the Morgan partnership and its expected future profits served, in a 
sense, as a performance bond that the Morgan partnership could post, but that 
other, smaller potential competitors could not. 
The disadvantages of financial concentration stressed by Progressives were 
certainly present. Conflicts of  interest were frequent and potentially severe. 
Often “Morganization” meant the creation of  value for shareholders by  the 
extraction of monopoly rents from consumers: if Westinghouse and General 
Electric share controlling directors,  their competition is unlikely  to be  too 
intense.6  And First National Bank chairman George F. Baker sat on the boards 
of six railroads that together carried 80 percent and owned 90 percent of Penn- 
sylvania anthracite. But there were positives on the other side-positives  ap- 
parently strong enough to support Morgan dominance over potential compet- 
itors  for  more  than  a  generation.  The  breaking  of  financier  control  over 
managers in the interwar period raised a new worry: is it better for managers 
to be unmonitored and effectively their own bosses than for them to be respon- 
sible to financiers (Berle and Means 1932)?’ 
6.3  Progressive and Finance Historian Perspectives 
on the Money nust 
Concern over this “money trust”-the  concentration of  the business of  is- 
suing the securities of  large corporations in the hands of  a few  investment 
6. An explicit watchword in Morgan reorganizations was “community of interest”: as long as 
the Pennsylvania Railroad held a large block of Erie Railroad stock, the Pennsylvania would suffer 
if  its actions undercut the profits of  the Erie. On the other hand, as Kolko (1963) points out, 
industries in which financiers could preserve monopoly by  strangling competitors at birth were 
almost nonexistent.  And Brandeis allowed that “lately  . . . the Westinghouse people were com- 
plaining that the General Electric’s competition was unfair” even though Lamont was a director of 
one and Steele a director of the other (see Lamont 1913). 
7. An issue present but unnoted in the Pujo report. On the one hand, the report stresses how 
shareholder apathy allows investment bankers to exercise dominant roles in choosing directors 
with only a minority of  the stock. On the other hand, it calls for direct election of directors and 
managers by the small shareholders.  The possibility that shareholder apathy combined with the 
elimination of financial capitalism would produce destructive managerial autonomy is not consid- 
ered. 211  Did Morgan’s Men Add Value? 
banks led by the Morgan partnership, and the associated presence of invest- 
ment bankers on boards of directors-dominated  public policy debate over 
the securities industry for the first third of  this century. The debate was re- 
solved only by the Great Depression. The presumed link between the stock 
market crash and the Depression left the securities industry without political 
defenders. The Glass-Steagall Act broke the links between board member- 
ship, investment banking, and commercial banking-based  management of as- 
set portfolios that had marked American finance between 1890 and  1930 (Se- 
ligman 1982). 
In retrospect, it is surprising that “financial capitalism” in America lasted 
so long, given the heat of the political hostility to it. The money trust was 
subject to two major congressional investigations, the first in  1912-13  by  a 
special House committee chaired by  ArZne Pujo and counseled by  Samuel 
Untermyer (triggered by the approach of a presidential election and Minnesota 
congressman Charles Lindbergh’s denunciation of the money trust; see Huer- 
tas and Cleveland 1987);*  the second in 1932-33  by the Senate Banking Com- 
mittee counseled by Ferdinand Pecora. 
6.3.1  The Progressive Perspective 
Progressives like Louis Brandeis were sure that the Morgan and Company- 
headed money trust exercised enormous control over industry, and that such 
control was a bad thing. Brandeis, ever sensitive to conflicts of interest, saw 
the money trust as a “concentration of distinct functions . . . beneficent when 
separately administered [but] . . . dangerous . . . when combined” (Brandeis 
1914,6). The money trust’s possession of monopoly power in the business of 
issuing  securities imposed  an  unreasonable  tax  on  all  companies  raising 
money in the capital market. And the links between corporate boards, invest- 
ment bankers, and portfolio managers-First  National Bank head George F. 
Baker was on the board of  AT&T and the prime mover behind AT&T’s ap- 
pointment of Theodore N. Vail  as its president; Morgan partner George W. 
Perkins was also a director of New York Life, which invested heavily in se- 
curities underwritten by  the Morgan partnership-created  a serious conflict 
of interest. Corporations sought to get as much for their securities as possible, 
and saving institutions sought to obtain high returns. 
Investment bankers like Baker and Perkins were thus in a position to sacri- 
fice the interests of one set of principals to the other-or  to increase the spread 
they received as middlemen.9  Perkins, testifying before Pujo and Untermyer, 
believed that he could determine whether a deal had come to him in his capac- 
8. Lindbergh’s son Charles, the aviator, was to marry the daughter of then Morgan partner 
Dwight Morrow, later U.S. ambassador to Mexico. 
9. For Brandeis, the freezing of individual initiative because few dared to run the risk of cross- 
ing Morgan appears to have been an equally serious problem. As Brandeis said to  Lamont, “You 
may not realize it, but you are feared, and I believe the effect of your position is toward paralysis 
rather than expansion” (Lamont 1913). 212  J. Bradford De Long 
ity as vice-president of New York Life or as partner of Morgan and Company 
and  bargain  accordingly.  Others  disagreed,  including National  City  Bank 
president Frank Vanderlip, who wrote, “There were times . . . when I op- 
posed underwriting fees because I felt they were too high. As a director [of 
the Union Pacific] I believed my obligation of trusteeship ran to the stockhold- 
ers, and not to [railroad president E. H.] Harriman. I have in mind recollec- 
tions of occasions when it was pointed out to me, in a hurt tone, that the City 
Bank was sharing in those underwriting profits that I thought were too fat” 
(Vanderlip and Sparkes 1935, 204-5).  The Progressive position on how to 
cure the evils of  the money trust called for the systematic prohibition of  all 
such conflicts of interest. Such a prohibition, Brandeis argued, would “not be 
an innovation. It will merely give full legal sanction to the fundamental law 
. . . that ‘No man can serve two masters’. . . . “10  rule of law has . . . been 
more rigorously applied than that which prohibits a trustee from occupying 
inconsistent positions. . . . And a director of a corporation is . . . a trustee” 
(Brandeis 1914,56). 
Progressives thus believed that the money trust’s dominance over finance 
and its exploitation of conflicts of interest reinforced one another. Exploitation 
of conflicts of interest generated funds necessary to reward those who coop- 
erated with present deals. And fear of the power of the money trust to freeze 
one out of  future deals restrained potential competitors.I0 But firms sought 
Morgan at least as much as the reverse. For example, it is difficult for the 
Progressive interpretation to account for the eagerness of the McCormick and 
Deering interests to involve the Morgan partnership in their merger into Inter- 
national Harvester if  the partnership’s raison d’&tre  was the exploitation of 
conflicts of interest.’! 
6.3.2  Finance Historian Perspectives 
By  contrast,  many finance historians today  argue that there never was a 
“money trust” in Brandeis’s sense.’* Vincent Carosso, for example, whose 
knowledge of the history and day-to-day workings of the Morgan partnership 
is unequalled, argues that investment bankers did not have a lock on their 
traditional clients. He argues instead that there was “very frequently interfer- 
10. Brandeis said that his belief in the power of the money trust came “from my own experi- 
ence. . . . I found that the policy of the New Haven . . . was loading it down so that . . . it could 
not possibly bear the burden.  . . . I went to some of the leading Boston bankers.  , . . I said--‘If 
this thing continues, the New Haven is going to be bankrupt. Won’t you please act in this manner 
and call Mr.Morgan’s attention to it.’ Their reply . . . was that they would not dare to . . . that the 
New Haven was Mr.  Morgan’s particular pet, that he resented any interference . . . and that it 
would be as much as their financial life was worth to try to poke their fingers in” (Lamont 1913). 
11. The McCormicks, at least, did worry about involving the Morgan partnership. They feared 
that their interests would be sacrificed to those of U.S. Steel, but decided to go ahead anyway with 
the merger on Morgan’s terms. In fact, Morgan partner George W.  Perkins did make some at- 
tempts to sacrifice International Harvester interests to those of U.S. Steel and the Morgan partner- 
ship (see Carstensen 1989, and section 6.6). 
12. In this they take a different tack than earlier historians like Fritz Redlich (1951). 213  Did Morgan’s Men Add Value? 
ence or attempted interference” in banker-client relationships, as Kuhn, Loeb 
head  Jacob Schiff told  Samuel Untermyer (Carosso 1970; Pujo Committee 
1913b).I3  Carosso further points out that Untermyer knew that there was no 
“unlawful industrial combination” in finance, and could only proceed by re- 
defining “money trust” as a “loose, elastic term” meaning a “close . . . under- 
standing among the men who dominate the financial destinies of our country 
and who wield fabulous power . . . through their control of corporate funds 
belonging to other people” (Carosso 1970, 139). He concludes that  Unter- 
myers was unable to demonstrate “the existence of a money trust . . . even in 
the sense in which . . . [he] defined it”  (ibid.,  151), for investment bankers 
did not “purposely act together; and even if they had, they would have been 
unable to impose their will upon the other directors . . . always more numer- 
ous than the representatives of Wall Street” (ibid., 151-52). 
In a similar vein, Huertas and Cleveland (1987) argue that the industry in 
which Morgan and his peers were engaged was contestable: anyone could 
accept a block of  securities, and then knock on doors until he found willing 
buyers who would take the placement. They see Pujo Committee counsel Un- 
termyer, at least, as guilty of  bad faith in his in~estigati0n.l~  For “aspiring 
politician” Untermyer, Huertas and Cleveland say,  the “appointment was a 
godsend.”15  But unfortunately, “not knowing . . . such an opportunity would 
come his way, Untermyer had stated in November 1910 . . . [that] ‘monopo- 
lies and  substantial domination of  industries . . . could be counted on the 
fingers of  your hand,’ and he [had] attacked ‘political partisans who seek to 
make personal and Party capital out of  a demagogic appeal to the unthink- 
ing’ ”  (Huertas and Cleveland 1987; citing Kolko 1963, 359 n. 53).16 
13. The majority of the Pujo Committee interpreted Schiffs evidence differently than Carosso, 
focusing instead on Schiffs assertion that he did “not think that another banking house of the 
standing of J. P.  Morgan and Company would accept an offer of the Union Pacific Company to 
negotiate its securities while it  [Union Pacific] was in the hands of Kuhn, Loeb, and Co.” The 
committee concluded that there was little competition in the business of underwriting securities 
for large companies in the sense of attempts by competitor investment banks to disrupt existing 
banker-client relationships (Pujo Committee  1913c; Untermyer 1915). The minority report took 
the Morgan partnership’s view (Pujo Committee 1913a). 
14. On the other hand, no one (with the exception of New York, New Haven, and Hartford 
president Mellen, who suggested Brandeis was working for Boston interests who wanted to loot 
the railroad) has challenged Brandeis’s good faith. 
15. Reading the transcripts  of  the hearings makes one more favorably disposed toward the 
finance historian view. It is easy to dislike Untermyer and Pecora, the counsels of the two congres- 
sional investigations. Neither had a “theory of the case.” In Untermyer’s 1907 hearings Morgan is 
first pilloried for having issued clearing-house  loan certificates during the panic of 1907 (thus 
illegally assuming the role of  a central bank) and then pilloried for not having issued enough 
clearing-house certificates (Pujo Committee 1913b). Both Untermyer and Pecora (1939) appear 
more interested in generating headlines than in laying the factual groundwork for legislation in the 
public interest. It is much easier to like and respect Brandeis, and to respect Morgan. 
16. It is also possible that Untermyer’s conversion to progressivism  was partly driven by  a 
desire for revenge against the Rockefeller interests,  which had outmaneuvered him in dealings 
surrounding the formation of Amalgamated Copper. Huertas and Cleveland do not address such 
issues, perhaps because this sword would cut both ways. James Stillman’s successor as City Bank 214  J. Bradford De Long 
But the finance historian perspective is as incomplete as the Progressive 
perspective. Progressives could not account for why owner-managers outside 
of  Morgan influence would ever wish to enter it. The historians of finance do 
not account for the Morgan partnership’s high profits. On their reading, mar- 
ket discipline left the Morgan partnership little freedom of action. But such 
market pressures should have led Morgan and Company to moderate its fees 
as well. 
6.4  The Money Wust’s Perspective on Itself 
Morgan’s supporters and ideologues at the time-for  example, the writer 
and journalist John Moody, founder of  Moody’s Investment Service-would 
have rejected the finance historian position that there was no money trust and 
did reject the Progressive position that the money trust survived by exploiting 
conflicts of  interest.  Instead,  Moody  argued that  there was  a  functioning 
money trust and that its existence was a good thing: supervision of firm man- 
agers by financiers was necessary given the need of enterprises for capital and 
the need of investors for trustworthy intermediaries to handle the selection of 
firms in which to invest (Moody 1904, 1912). 
Without domination of  boards of directors by the investment banking oli- 
garchs, there would be no effective way for scattered individual shareholders 
to monitor the performance of corporate managers. Only investment bankers 
could effectively monitor firm managers, and so the presence of  investment 
bankers on boards signaled to ultimate investors that the firm management 
was competent and industrious. Some executives preferred to avoid Morgan 
control if possible. Richmond Terminal executive W.  P.  Clyde, for example, 
was alleged to have told Morgan in a private meeting that “I’ve bought Rich- 
mond Terminal at 7 or 8 and sold it at 15 twice in the last few years. I see no 
reason why I shouldn’t do it again.” And he tried to block the inclusion of the 
Richmond Terminal within the sphere of Morgan’s influence. 
Moody’s positive view of  the money trust was not his own invention. His 
view was more or less the consensus view held by the securities industry and 
was a commonplace in the early literature on investment banking. Willis and 
Bogen’s early investment banking textbook, for example, argued that the 
investment banker, intimately concerned as he is with the affairs of  the cor- 
poration for  which  he  has  sold  bonds,  since the continued meeting of 
the obligation on these bonds is essential to the maintenance of the invest- 
ment banker’s prestige, often takes . . . a voice in control as a matter of 
president,  Frank Vanderlip, judged City Bank deals in which William Rockefeller appeared on 
both sides as “the means of some of the worst abuses that occurred in Wall Street” (Vanderlip and 
Sparkes 1935). Huertas and Cleveland do not pursue the tangled relationships between Unter- 
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course. . . . This kind of power over the affairs of the borrowing enterprise 
represents the correlative of the moral responsibility which he has assumed 
toward the holder of  the bonds or stock he has sold. . . . [Tlhis manage- 
ment function . . . gives the buyer . . . an  assurance that the banker has 
knowledge of  what is being done by  the borrowing concern, and also of 
better management . . . [and] explains why investors . . . place so much 
stress, in purchasing securities, on the character and reputation of the house 
of  issue. . . . The history of American business has hitherto been marked 
by  a steady increase in the influence of  the investment banker for these 
reasons. (Willis and Bogen 1929, 31). 
The same assessment was made more pithily by New York, New Haven, and 
Hartford president Charles Mellen, in a private conversation with journalist 
C. W.  Barron: “I wear the Morgan collar, but I am proud of  it” (Pound and 
Moore 1931, 273).” 
This assessment of the situation was also the official view of the industry. 
Morgan himself is quoted as giving the answer “Your railroad? Your railroad 
belongs to my clients” to railroad executives who did not know their place. 
The partnership of Morgan and Company responded to Pujo by  writing an 
open letter giving their view of the functioning of the securities market. This 
pamphlet (primarily written by  Morgan partner Henry Davison) argued that 
the reason the partnership had control over investors’ funds was “thousands of 
investors . . . seeking . . . securities . . . have neither the knowledge nor the 
opportunity for investigating a great  . . . enterprise” (Davison  1913,  18). 
They “look to a banking house to perform those functions and to give its 
stamp of  approval.” Morgan and Company’s approval had become “a large 
factor which inspires confidence in the investor and leads him to purchase.” 
The practice of banker representation on boards 
has arisen not from a desire on the part of the banker to manage the daily 
affairs of the corporation or to purchase its securities more cheaply than he 
otherwise would; but rather because of his moral responsibility as sponsor 
for the corporation’s securities, to keep an eye upon its policies and to pro- 
tect the interests of investors in the securities of  that corporation. . . . In- 
quiry will readily develop the fact that the members of the leading banking 
houses . . . are besought continually to act as directors . . . and that in 
general they enter only those boards which the opinion of the investing 
17. A statement made in private and off  the record-Barron’s  notes of his conversations were 
later found, edited, and published. A similar impression of Mellen’s relationship to  Morgan is 
given by  Brandeis (in Lamont  1913), who recalls that he “hit upon a matter . . . of manifest 
advantage to the [New Haven raillroad, and through a friend I submitted it to  Mr. Mellen. Mr. 
Mellen sent back word that he would submit it promptly to Mr. Morgan. . . . Mellen’s reply was 
that Mr. Morgan did not think well of the matter. . . . At my behest, my friend went back to Mr. 
Mellen . . . asking if he would not submit it to Mr. Morgan once more. Mr. Mellen said-’What, 
go to Mr. Morgan a second time on a matter, after he has already expressed his opinion on it? No 
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public requires them to enter, as evidence of good faith that they are willing 
to have their names publicly associated with the management. (Ibid., 17)18 
Morgan and Company, moreover, argued that their influence over investors’ 
choice of securities was not dangerous because it was disciplined by the mar- 
ket.  If the firm lost its reputation for “character”-placed  investors in secu- 
rities  that  were  profitable  to it  but  offered  poor  returns-or  another  firm 
acquired a reputation as a superior judge of risk, Morgan control would dis- 
appear: 
The public,  that is the depositors, are the ones who entrust bankers with 
such influence and power as they today have in every civilized land, and the 
public is unlikely to entrust that power to weak or evil hands. Your counsel 
asked more than one witness whether the present power held by bankers 
. . . would not be a menace if it lay in evil hands. . . . The only genuine 
power which an individual . . . can gain is that arising from the confidence 
reposed in him . . . by the community.  . . . [Mlen are entrusted with such 
heavy responsibilities because of  the confidence which their records have 
established,  and only so long as their records are unblemished do they re- 
tain such trusts. These . . . axioms . , . apply . . . more emphatically . . . 
to banking than to any other form of commerce. To banking the confidence 
of the community is the breath from which it draws its life. The past is full 
of examples where the slightest suspicion as to the conservatism,  or the 
methods  of  a bank’s  management, has  destroyed  confidence  and  drawn 
away its deposits overnight. (Ibid., 25-26) 
The investment bankers thus claimed that their oligarchy and their presence 
on boards  had  three  benefits:  First,  investment banker  representation  on  a 
board warranted that the firm was managed by capable and energetic execu- 
tives.  Promising  and  well-managed  businesses  would thus be  able to issue 
securities on more favorable terms with investment banker representation. 
Second, investment banker representation  provided an easy way  to learn 
about the performance of managers and to dismiss them if they failed to mea- 
sure up. The investment banking oligarchs provided an effective mechanism 
for monitoring executives and replacing those who performed badly; in Mor- 
gan and Company’s view such monitoring and supervision were more easily 
performed on the board than off it. 
Third, the  concentration  of the  business improved the functioning of  the 
market.  The wealth  and  dominant  position  of  the  Morgan  partnership  de- 
18. Lamont provided Brandeis with a similar justification of  Morgan representation on boards, 
saying that “as you realize, we have generally drifted onto these various railroad and industrial 
boards because we had first undertaken to place a large block of the corporation’s securities with 
our clients, and we felt a sense of responsibility to those clients which we fulfilled by keeping an 
eye upon the corporation in which they had invested. We have felt that that was a strong factor in 
enabling us to market these securities, and while the responsibility was a very onerous one, never- 
theless, we shouldered it. Don’t you think there is quite a little in that point?” Brandeis agreed 
that it was an important point but saw no reason why bankers needed to exercise control rather 
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pended on  its reputation for “character.” A firm with a large market  share 
could never be tempted to sacrifice its reputation for the sake of the profits of 
any one deal because such an unsound deal could destroy its reputation as an 
honest broker-the  Morgan partnership said that its reputation could disap- 
pear “overnight.” A firm with a small market share might sacrifice future rep- 
utation for present profits. 
It is somewhat ironic that firm defenders of private privilege, property, and 
capitalism like Moody and Davison wound up  advocating a system for the 
assessment and allocation of investment that appears in many respects, from 
an early-twentieth-century perspective at least, “socialist.” The forty-five em- 
ployees of Morgan and Company approved and vetoed proposed top manag- 
ers, decided what securities they would underwrite, and thus implicitly de- 
cided what  securities would  be  issued and  what  lines of  business should 
receive additional capital.  Savers followed their advice. And  the net effect 
appears similar to what would be done by a centralized investment planning 
directorate. The major difference is that the judgment of Morgan and his part- 
ners was substituted for that of  some bureaucracy in deciding which invest- 
ment projects were to be undertaken.19 Instead of being decided by a market, 
the allocation of investment and the choice of firm managers was decided by 
a hierarchy, albeit a loose one (and one that felt itself subject to market disci- 
pline in the long run, in which the partnership can gain or lose its reputation 
for “character”)  .*O 
The Morgan partnership’s stress on the importance of  its reputation pro- 
vides an answer to the question of  what was the money trust’s competitive 
edge. High profit rates could coexist with ease of entry into investment bank- 
ing because there was no rapid way for new firms to acquire that “reputation” 
that was the Morgan partnership’s chief institutional asset. Progressives never 
supplied an answer to the question of why firms and investors continued to 
use the Morgan partnership, given the high fees it charged and the fact that 
you could never be sure when you hired Morgan and Company that it would 
19. This is not quite right. On the one hand, Morgan and Company were shareholders’ agents, 
not the public’s. On the other hand, Morgan and Company had a strong incentive to run an effi- 
cient operation and make the “correct” investment decisions from shareholders’ point of view: 
they faced competition from Kuhn, hb,  from National City, and from others. Bureaucracies, by 
contrast, have many other objectives than the accomplishment of their legally mandated mission. 
20. This identification of an investment banking partnership’s reputation as an honest broker as 
(from the resource allocation side) a valuable social asset and (from the market structure side) a 
sizable barrier to entry raises the question of how the Morgan partnership acquired its reputation 
in  the first place. It  appears to have grown up slowly. The London banking house of  George 
Peabody and Company specialized in selling American state bonds to European investors. Pea- 
body and Company was very anxious that the bonds it sold turn out to be good investments-even 
contributing “campaign contributions” to Daniel Webster to induce him to make speeches for debt 
repayment  (Chernow  1990). After  J.  S.  Morgan  joined  Peabody  and  Company,  the  house 
branched out from state government bonds to selling American railroad securities to European 
investors. The reputation gained was then also applied by J. S. and J. P.  Morgan to selling Amer- 
ican railroad  securities  to American  investors,  and then by  J.  P.  Morgan  to  selling American 
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act in your interest when your interest came into conflict with the interests of 
its other clients. Finance historians never explained the sources of the money 
trust’s high fees. Morgan and Company did give an answer to both questions: 
firms and investors come to us because they know that we have been honest 
brokers in the past-and  they know that they can trust us because we have too 
much invested in the business to risk by  failing to be honest brokers in the 
present. 
The negative effects of financial capitalism stressed by Progressives are not 
blotted out by  these investment banker arguments that the structure of pre- 
Depression American finance served useful economic purposes.21  The con- 
flicts of  interest identified remain conflicts of  interest; the high fees and rela- 
tive absence of  competition for different firms’ business remain a tax on the 
provision of  capital to the industrial sector. But the financial capitalists saw 
themselves as creating value, at least for shareholders. And given that a repu- 
tation as a competent analyst and an honest broker is difficult to develop and 
can be  a valuable  social asset,  domination of  turn-of-the-century financial 
markets by  the Morgan partnership and its peers may have been better than 
the alternative. 
6.5  The Value of Morgan’s Men 
Examination of the cross-sectional pattern of the market values of Morgan- 
influenced corporations supports the claim that  Morgan influence was  as- 
sociated with enhanced value. According to the lists compiled by  the Pujo 
investigation, in  1912 Morgan or his partners sat on the boards of  twenty 
manufacturing, mining, distribution, transport, or utility companies that had 
actively quoted common  stocks-three  utilities,  nine  railroads,  and  eight 
other companies. Data on these twenty companies, and on sixty-two other 
control companies of  similar size, were collected for  1911 and  1912 from 
Poor’s Manuals of railroad, industrial, and utility securities.22 
Table 6.1 reports regressions of the average relative price of the firm’s com- 
mon stock (relative to its book value) on whether the firm’s board of directors 
21. For Brandeis, at least, the key objection was in large part not economic but political and 
psychological. Brandeis tends to speak not of efficiency and productivity but of  experimentation 
and individualism. He told Lamont that he saw J. P. Morgan’s power as “dangerous, highly dan- 
gerous. The reason, I think, is that it hampers the freedom of  the individual. The only way that 
we are going to work out our problems in this country is to have the individual free, not free to do 
unlicensed things, but free to work and to trade without the fear of some gigantic power threaten- 
ing to engulf him every moment,  whether that power be  a monopoly in oil or in credit” (see 
Lamont 1913). 
22. Partners in Boston investment banks like Lee, Higginson, and Company or Kidder, Pea- 
body served on too few boards of directors apart from Morgan partners to allow for the quantita- 
tive estimation of a “Lee” or a “Kidder” premium. Kuhn, Loeb did not insist on holding board 
memberships in corporations under its influence, so it is more difficult to track the extent of its 
active involvement in monitoring corporations.  For these reasons this section deals with J.  P. 
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Table 6.1  The Value of Having a Morgan Partner as a Board Member 
Independent Variables 
Morgan  Utility  Adjusted 



















0.021  0.834 
0.038  0.830 
-  1.834*  Earningsiprice  0.270  0.730 
(0.304) 
1.680*  Log booWpar value  0.180  0.177 
(0.374) 
0.569*  Log earnings/book  0.236  0.726 
(0.073) 
Source: As described in text. 
Nore: Dependent variable is log of  average 1911-12  stock price relative to book value (eighty- 
two observations, including twenty Morgan companies). Standard errors in parentheses. 
Corporate board contains a partner of J. P. Morgan and Company. 
*P(t)  < .05 (one-tailed). 
included a Morgan partner and on control variables. The first thing to note is 
that standard errors are large: the set of  Morgan companies contains only 
twenty, and the spread of  returns within this set is very large.  Since these 
twenty companies are the only source of variation for identifying the Morgan 
influence coefficients, gathering more data would not lead to a more precise 
estimate of the Morgan influence coefficient. 
One implication of the high standard errors on the Morgan influence coef- 
ficient is that its estimates are very sensitive to the treatment of  outliers. The 
International Mercantile Marine Company’s common stock had a return of 
-  25 percent per year over the decade before World War I. Had this promotion 
been a success, the estimates of the Morgan influence coefficient would have 
been higher by  an additional 15 to 20 percent. Similarly, if  the New  York, 
New Haven, and Hartford’s price had collapsed in 191  1 rather than two years 
later (Staples 1954), the estimated Morgan influence coefficient would have 
been from 5 to 8 percent less. 
The first row of table 6.1 shows that corporations with a Morgan partner on 
their boards of directors have a logarithm of common stock q-the  ratio of the 
common stock’s market  value to the book value of  common stockholders’ 
equity-higher  than other companies by 0.259, corresponding to a 30 percent 
increase in the common stock’s market value. This coefficient is imprecisely 
estimated: an analyst who began with completely diffuse prior beliefs about 
this coefficient and examined row one would conclude that there were nine 
chances out of ten that the true effect on the stock price of having a Morgan 
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only that there were two chances out of three that the true effect was between 
10 and 40 percent. 
The second row adds a dummy variable for whether the company is a utility. 
Utilities have higher ratios of price to book value than railroads or industrials 
in this period.23  Inclusion of the utility dummy does not materially affect the 
size of the Morgan influence variable, but does push it across the line of statis- 
tical significance at the.05 level (although there are still only two chances in 
three that the effect is between 10 and 40 percent of common stock value). 
The estimated impact of adding a Morgan partner does not seem out of line 
if one considers how much Morgan’s financial services cost. For International 
Harvester-a  simple  and  straightforward  deal-the  investment  bankers’ 
share was about 4 percent of  the capital value floated (equal in  value to 8 
percent of the post-1906 common stock). For U.S. Steel the investment bank- 
ers’ share was  10 percent (in value 30 percent of  the common stock). Such 
large fees can be justified-if  they can be justified-only  if the unique value 
added by this particular group of financiers is substantial. If  the Morgan influ- 
ence coefficient does reflect a true increase in value, not just  the result of 
chance, then investment banking fees appear to take up a sizable chunk, but 
not all, of the increased value. 
Row three shows that the Morgan influence coefficient is not affected by the 
inclusion in the regression of the corporation’s earningdprice ratio. If Morgan 
companies were selling for higher prices on the stock market because Morgan 
influence allowed the exploitation of monopoly power, we would expect Mor- 
gan  companies to  have a high  earnings/price ratio:  earning in  the present 
would  be  high,  but  prices would  not  rise in  proportion because investors 
would look forward to the long-run erosion of monopoly power in the face of 
new entry. In this case, we would find in row three that companies with high 
earnings/price ratios had high ratios of price to book value, and that inclusion 
of the earningdprice ratio reduced the Morgan influence coefficient. This is 
not so, but this test is weak: all that can be said is that the cross-sectional data 
do not speak strongly for the hypothesis that Morgan influence raises share- 
holder value because it allowed the exercise of monopoly power. 
Row four shows that the Morgan influence coefficient is not materially af- 
fected by the inclusion in the regression of the ratio of common stock book to 
par value. This ratio is a measure of the corporation’s accumulated surplus. It 
is thus a proxy for the long-run growth of the company-of  how much earn- 
ings have been in excess of  dividends since the creation of the firm’s current 
capital structure. If Morgan influence was associated with high value because 
Morgan limited his long-run associations to profitable and rapidly growing 
companies, then inclusion of the ratio of book to par value should reduce the 
size of the Morgan influence coefficient. Instead, the Morgan influence coef- 
23. Experimentation with a railroad dummy variable found no significant  effect. 221  Did Morgan's Men Add Value? 
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ficient rises. In row four, there appear to be two chances in three that the true 
effect is between 25 and 70 percent. 
Row five shows the effect of adding the return on capital-the  ratio of earn- 
ings to book value-to  the regression. The estimated Morgan partner coeffi- 
cient declines to almost nothing (it is always imprecisely estimated). Figure 
6.1 plots the data underlying the regression in row five. The gray lines mark 
the average values of  the log price/book and earnings/book values for non- 
Morgan companies. They divide the graph into quadrants. 
Figure 6.1 shows why the estimated Morgan influence coefficient becomes 
indistinguishable from zero in the row five specification. Of the twenty Mor- 
gan companies, fifteen have higher market prices relative to book values than 
the average non-Morgan company. All fifteen of these also have higher ratios 
of earnings to book value than the average non-Morgan company. Three Mor- 
gan companies have both lower than average prices and lower than average 
earnings-the  Chicago-Great Western, the Erie, and the Southern railroads. 
Two Morgan companies have higher than average earnings but lower than av- 
erage prices-the  Baldwin Locomotive Company and the International Mer- 
cantile Marine. 
This suggests that, to the extent that Morgan partners added value, they did 
so by  making the companies they monitored more profitable, not by  signifi- 
cantly raising the share price paid for a company of given profitability. It also 
accounts for why inclusion of the earningdbook value reduces the estimated 
Morgan influence coefficient so severely. In this sample, having a high price/ 
book value, having high earningdbook, and having a Morgan partner on the 
board of directors are all strongly associated. Given that a firm has a high ratio 
Gt  Western 
x International Mercantile Marine 
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X Morgan Companies  0  Non-Morgan Companies 
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Baldwin Locomotiv 
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of  current earnings to book value, there is not much additional information 
about its relative stock price that can be deduced from the fact that it also has 
a Morgan partner on its board of directors. 
It is particularly stnking that Morgan companies have high ratios of  earn- 
ings to book  values, given that Morgan companies are reputed to have had 
abnormally high book values. One of  Brandeis’s most frequent criticisms of 
money trust practices was the overstatement of  book values through “water- 
ing” the stock. Book values in “Morganized” companies thus represented not 
the cost of the business’s physical assets but instead investment bankers’ as- 
sessments of  its earning power (Dewing 1914). Stock watering inflates book 
values and moves Morgan companies down and to the left in figure 6.1. It is 
thus very noteworthy that the Morgan-influenced companies are nevertheless 
clustered in the upper right-hand comer of the figure. 
The regression in row five of table 6.1 is subject to differing interpretations, 
however, and is “fragile” in the sense of  resting to a large degree on the per- 
formance of  the outlying extremes of Morgan’s financial empire. A key role 
in generating the estimates is played by the one extreme negative outlier: the 
International Mercantile Marine Company. The conclusion that the Morgan 
influence does not increase the price paid for companies of given profitability 
is reversed if one uses nonparametric tests that downweight extreme observa- 
tions-in  this case the International Mercantile Marine. 
Figure 6.1 also shows that, of  the twenty Morgan-influenced companies, 
fifteen have higher stock prices than would be predicted by the estimated re- 
gression line for the non-Morgan companies. Such a division would happen 
by chance only one time in a hundred if the Morgan influence were truly zero. 
Thus this nonparametric view can reject the null hypothesis that the Morgan 
touch did not matter for the median company-even  in  the specification of 
row five-at  the .01 level. But the performance of the International Mercan- 
tile Marine Company was so bad as to make the quantitative estimate of the 
geometric average Morgan influence coefficient indistinguishable from zero. 
Table 6.2 presents nominal rates of return realized on common stock invest- 
ments in “Morganized” corporations. For corporations that acquired a Morgan 
board member after 1895, rates of return are calculated from that year to 19  13. 
For corporations that had Morgan board members as of  1895, rates of return 
are calculated from 1895 to 19  13. 
In  table 6.2 there is no sign that stockholders received, on average, less 
than  fair market  returns-as  measured by  the returns earned by  Cowles’s 
(1938) extension backward in time of the Standard and Poor’s composite port- 
folio-on  their investments in newly Morganized companies. There is no sign 
of any deterioration in the quality of the reorganizations undertaken: investors 
in Westinghouse and in Baldwin Locomotive toward the end of  the  1900- 
1913 period realized rates of return that were higher than those realized ear- 
lier. And there is no sign that the Morgan name was used to trick investors Table 6.2  Stock Market Rates of Return on “Morganized” Companies 
Company 
Excess Returnsa (%) 
Date  Return  Rate of  Market  Paper  Commercial  Stock 
Morganized  to 1913  Return (%)  Return  Returnb (%)  Paper  Market 
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3.66  7.21 
1.52  8.37 
1.56  22.23 
15.63  15.27 
0.07  -24.85 
2.23  7.30 
1.14  6.64 
8.82  12.09 
2.59  7.94 
2.57  18.85 
8.46 
(4.04) 
13.54  14.48 
1.88  3.73 
2.53  5.16 
10.09  14.45 





















4.61  2.60 
4.61  3.76 
4.61  17.62 
4.61  10.66 
4.61  -  29.46 
4.61  2.69 
4.61  2.03 
4.61  7.48 
4.61  3.33 
4.61  14.24 
4.61  3.85 
4.61  9.87 
4.61  -0.88 
4.61  0.55 
4.61  9.84 
4.61  -0.28 
4.61  6.29 






-  1.32 
4.13 







-  3.63 
2.94 
Source: As described in text. 
Relative to diversified investments in commercial paper and in the stock market. 
bAverage nominal returns earned  over  1890-1914  by  stock market investments,  as estimated by  the  Cowles Commission backward 
extension of the Standard and Poor’s Composite portfolio, and by investments in high-grade commercial paper. 224  J. Bradford De Long 
into buying unsound and overpriced unduly “watered”  the prices at 
which  the Morgan syndicates offered common stock in Morgan-influenced 
companies appear to have been on average fair prices. 
Together, tables 6.1 and 6.2 support the Morgan partnership’s claim that it 
played a productive and valuable role in the corporations it influenced. Stock- 
holders in Morgan corporations do not appear to have overpaid for their in- 
vestments. Morgan companies sold at higher multiples of  book value than 
other companies, and they did so not because of the advertising value of the 
Morgan name but because they earned higher returns on capital. 
Regressions, of course, cannot sort out the causal chain. It could be that the 
addition of a Morgan partner to the board leads to the replacement of bad and 
the shaping-up of good managers. It could be that Morgan partners joined the 
board only if  they had confidence in the management, and that Morgan and 
Company were skillful investors but had no effect on the performance of the 
economy as a whole. 
Event studies of the short-run effect on asset values of the announcement of 
Morgan interest in a company could sort out the chain of causation and reveal 
investors’ expectations of the value of the Morgan touch. But too many “Mor- 
ganized” companies were closely or privately held before the Morgan interests 
took a hand. Their pre-Morgan values cannot be ascertained. We  know what 
such event studies would show: owners must have expected to reap profits 
from reorganizations and restructurings even net of the Morgan partnership’s 
commissions or they would not have invited the Morgan partnership in. But 
our inability to perform event studies on our sample means that we  do not 
know how much investors thought the Morgan touch was worth. 
The next section tries to shed some light on these questions of causation by 
examining what Morgan influence really was, and trying to determine how 
the Morgan partnership exercised its monitoring and control functions in the 
cases of individual operating companies (table 6.3). 
6.6  International Harvester and AT&T 
In both of the cases considered here, investment bankers played an active 
and powerful but limited role. They took pains to ensure that the firms had the 
right managers but otherwise left the management alone. It is not fair to criti- 
cize these two case studies on the grounds that they examine successes-that 
in other firms investment banker intervention failed to create value. As section 
6.5 has shown, the typical Morganized firm was, in fact, a success. It pro- 
duced higher stock market values without inducing investors to overpay. It is, 
however, fair to criticize these two case studies as examples in which value 
may  have been  created primarily as a result of  the creation of  monopoly 
power: the relative roles of  monopoly and efficiency in  the “Morganization 
24. A hypothesis advocated by Dewing (1914). 225  Did Morgan’s Men Add Value? 
Table 6.3  Companies under Morgan Influence on the Eve of World War I 
Adams Express Co. 
AT&T 
Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railroad 
Baldwin Locomotive Co. 
Chicagdreat  Western Railroad 
Erie Railroad 
General Electric Co. 
International Agricultural CO.~ 
New York, New Haven, and Hartford Railroad 
Northern Pacific Railroad 
New York Central Railroad 
Pere Marquette Railroad’ 
Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co. 
Public Service Cow. of New Jersey 
Pullman Co. 
Reading Railroad 
International Mercantile Marine Co.  Southern Railroad 
International Harvester Co.  U.S. Steel Co. 
Lehigh Valley Railroad  Westinghouse Co. 
aNot included in regressions; satisfactory data unavailable. 
premium” cannot be determined in a fashion convincing enough to overcome 
prior beliefs. 
6.6.1  International Harvester 
An  opening to consolidate the farm machinery industry appeared at the 
beginning of the 1900s. The McCormick firm-established  by the inventor of 
the reaper, Cyrus H. McCormick-had  been under heavy competitive pres- 
sure from the rapidly expanding Deering firm. William Deering  ’s children 
were much less interested in running their firm and establishing competitive 
predominance  over  McCormick.  The  three  sons  of  the  founding  Mc- 
Cormick-Cyrus,  Stanley, and Harold-were  also eager to see a reorganiza- 
tion of the industry. But each family was also strongly averse to handing con- 
trol of their firm over to the other (McCormick 1931; Carstensen 1989). 
There did appear to be substantial economies of scale to be gained by inte- 
grating the firms’ production operations. U.S. Steel head Elbert Gary (a close 
adviser of the Deering family) told the McCormicks that he estimated that the 
stock of the amalgamated firm would be worth 35 percent more than the stock 
of the two separate firms. Moreover, he attributed this gain to efficiency, writ- 
ing that “this increase would not be fictitious but real value, owing to the fact 
that by a combination they would secure stability of  prices and diminishing 
expenses even though they did not secure increased average prices” (Garraty 
1960, 128). 
If  monopoly power did allow the new,  integrated firm to increase its aver- 
age prices, the extra profits from amalgamation would of course be higher. 
J. P.  Morgan and Company felt that such monopoly power would easily be 
gained, and that as a result the McCormicks should not worry that using Wall 
Street money to combine the firms would harm their reputation with  their 
farmer customers: after all, the Morgan partners remarked, the farmers had no 
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Morgan  partner George W.  Perkins explained to  the brothers the terms 
under which Morgan and Company would take charge of  the deal. Perkins 
emphasized that “Morgan would . . . insist on choosing all officers and direc- 
tors of the new company” and that “this point . . .  Morgan and Company have 
found indispensable in making their combinations” (Garraty 1960, 133). The 
McCormicks, the Deenngs, and the owners of  two other, smaller firms in- 
cluded in the new International Harvester corporations took all the stock of 
the new  company; since no issue of  securities was required,  Morgan and 
Company charged less than their normal fee-they  took only 3 percent of the 
company up front in fees. After organization, Morgan and Company retained 
ultimate control over the firm. All stock was committed to a voting trust, the 
trustees of which were one McCormick, one Deering, and Perkins. 
The McCormicks had  some doubts about  committing themselves to the 
hands of the Morgan partnership. They feared that Harvester interests would 
be subordinated to those of U.S. Steel or to the Morgan partnership in general 
(Carstensen 1989). Their fears were well founded: Perkins did place Interna- 
tional Harvester money on deposit with the Morgan bank interest-free, and he 
did unsuccessfully attempt to have International Harvester sell steel properties 
developed by the Deenngs to U.S. Steel for a fire-sale price.25 
For the first few years of  its operation, the performance of  International 
Harvester was disappointing. Rationalization of the firm’s product lines was 
blocked; integration of production proceeded only very slowly (U.S. Depart- 
ment of  Commerce 1913). In  1906 Perkins removed remaining McCormick 
and Deering family members from management and replaced them with sala- 
ried professionals. The younger Cyrus H. McCormick alone remained as head 
of  the company. According to Garraty (1960), “the younger element in the 
company” was advanced to positions of greater influence, and thereafter Inter- 
national Harvester’s performance was more satisfactory. 
6.6.2  AT&T 
Banker influence on AT&T can be clearly seen in one action: the return to 
the Bell System and accession to power of  Theodore N. Vail.  Vail  had been 
hired for the telephone company by  Alexander Graham Bell’s father-in-law, 
Gardiner Hubbard, at the end of the 1870s. He performed very well as general 
manager of  American Bell and as president of  its long-distance subsidiary 
during the initial expansion of the telephone network to the urban East and 
Midwest (Paine 1921; Danielan 1939). 
In 1887, however, Vail resigned. A growing dissatisfaction “with his posi- 
25. The McCormicks took  offense.  Their  lawyers wrote  that  Perkins  was  (unconsciously) 
biased in  favor of the U.S.  Steel interests, and that  this unconscious bias was even worse than 
dishonesty, for “a dishonest man is at least prudent.” The McCormicks wanted the Deering steel 
properties to be purchased by International Harvester at fire-sale prices and then sold to U.S.  Steel 
for what the traffic would bear (see Carstensen 1989). 227  Did Morgan’s Men Add Value? 
tion at this period was due . . . to the company’s reluctance to spend money 
in keeping the service at maximum” and rapidly expanding the network. Vail 
had wished to pay low dividends and to plow retained earnings back into the 
rapid creation of a single comprehensive national telephone network. The ma- 
jor stockholders and their nominees, for example John E. Hudson, president 
of American Bell from 1889 to 1900, had a different view. They saw that they 
owned a money machine; they thought this money machine should pay high 
dividends. After a clash of views Vail  left the company, unwilling to be the 
chief  implementer of  competitive strategies with which he disagreed. The 
1887 annual report made no mention of his resignation or indeed of his ser- 
vices to the company at all, suggesting a high degree of strain and bad feelings 
(Brooks 1976). 
After the expiration of  Bell’s key patents, Hudson’s presidency, and to a 
lesser extent that of  his immediate successors, saw a steady loss of market 
share to a large group of alternative, local telephone networks. American Bell 
did pay high dividends. American Bell did not, however, move to consolidate 
its nationwide natural monopoly. 
A general consensus within the reorganized Bell System, now  headed by 
AT&T, toward a shift to renewed rapid expansion developed in the first years 
of  this century. Frederick Fish (president of AT&T from 1902 to 1907) went 
to the markets to raise money for renewed expansion. 
The subsequent securities issues gave the investment bankers their opening. 
The company’s massive financing requirements, and the fact that it had be- 
come difficult to raise money as the panic of  1907 drew near, brought the Bell 
System close to default. The investment bankers’ price for continuing to fi- 
nance the company was that its next president should be someone they trusted: 
Theodore N. Vail. First National Bank president and Morgan ally George F. 
Baker had been very  impressed with Vail’s  performance in other dealings. 
Vail’s past record at the telephone company was well known. And who better 
to head up a company now devoted to rapid nationwide expansion than a man 
who had been advocating such a competitive strategy twenty years earlier? 
Vail did for AT&T what he was installed to do. He oversaw its expansion 
to a true nationwide telephone system. And he turned out to be very skillful at 
keeping the government and public convinced that AT&T was a productive 
natural-and  not an exploitative artificial-monopoly.  In the choice of Vail, 
as in the creation of  International Harvester, investment bankers appear to 
have exerted their influence in a positive direction both from the perspective 
of  shareholders’ long-run interest and from the perspective of  the long-run 
economic growth of the United States. 
Other case studies could be chosen to paint a different picture. The Inter- 
national Mercantile Marine Company was a failure from the beginning, and 
the Charles Mellen-run New  York,  New Haven, and Hartford Railroad was 
denounced as unsound and monopolistic by  Louis Brandeis for nearly a dec- 228  J. Bradford De Long 
ade, at the end of which it did indeed collapse.26  But the performance of Mor- 
ganized firms was in general good-not  bad-and  in these two not unrepre- 
sentative cases  of  good  performance  the  Morgan partnership  did  play  a 
significant role in selecting managers. 
6.7  Extensions 
6.7.1  Financial Capitalism in Comparative Perspective 
Around the turn of the century Germany and Japan also saw the growth of 
their securities markets take on a “finance capitalist” pattern. Consider first 
imperial Germany.  In  1914 its  largest banks-such  as  the  Deutsche,  the 
Dresdner,  and  the  Darmstadter-dominated  the  German  capital  market. 
Founded in imitation of  the French Crkdit Mobilier, these banks made it a 
business principle from the very outset to maintain permanent representation 
on the boards of  directors and to hold a significant number of  shares of  the 
companies they pr~moted.~’ 
The role played by the great banks in monitoring and supervising corporate 
managements was an accepted part of  German financial theory in the years 
before World War I (Riesser 191  1). There was a clear sense that this “monitor- 
ing” role was  a very  valuable one. Riesser, for example,  saw the German 
banks as valuable because of “both the continuity of their existence and regard 
for their ‘issue credit,’ i.e., the permanent ability of  maintaining among the 
German public a market for new securities issued under their auspices,” which 
“insured a permanent interest on the part of these banks in the [health of the] 
newly created [corporations] as well as in the securities which they were in- 
strumental in placing on the market (Riesser 191  1, 367; see also 343). 
In  Japan, the prewar zuibarsu and their more diffuse postwar keiretsu re- 
placements appear to have played a similar role, in which once again the pat- 
26. In his conversation with Brandeis, Lamont tried very hard to distance Morgan and Company 
from the New York, New Haven, and Hartford, protesting “but Mr. Brandeis, we don’t attempt to 
manage railroads.  . . . Nobody realizes better than we that that is not our function. We give the 
best counsel that we can in the selection of good men, making mistakes sometimes, as in the case 
of  Mellen,  but on the whole doing fairly well,  and  we  give our very best advice on financial 
policy.  . . . [The] expansion of the New Haven  was due, and solely due, to Mr. Mellen’s own 
policy and initiative, and . . . the mistakes which Mr. Morgan and his fellow directors made . . . 
[were] not of  initiation,  but of  almost blindly following and endorsing Mellen’s policies.  Mr. 
Morgan had that large nature which led him almost blindly to have faith in a man when once it 
was established” (Lamont 1913). 
27. Many have argued that the influence exerted by the great banks on industry was substantial: 
the Deutsche Bank had its representatives on the boards of  159 companies in 1912. Great banks 
were at once promoting syndicates and originating syndicates, acceptance houses, and sources of 
short- and long-term commercial credit. In the words of Feis (1964,63), “the holders of shares in 
a German Great Bank were participants in an  investment trust (among many other things).  . . . 
The risks arising from immobilization of resources” through their commitment to the development 
of industry “the banks met . . . through their large capital . . .  their retention of  control [and] . . . 
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tern of influence of finance over industry is reminiscent of Morgan and Com- 
pany  (Hoshi,  Kashyap,  and  Scharfstein  1989). The bank  and the  trading 
company of a given enterprise group exercise influence over the policies and 
senior personnel appointments of  the affiliated companies. However, this in- 
fluence is usually held in abeyance “unless the member company is in difficul- 
ties” (Dore 1987; also Thurow 1986). 
It is clear that in the United States and in Germany the existence of “finance 
capitalist” institutions played a significant role in the expansion of managerial 
capitalism. Investment banker willingness to choose and monitor managers 
appears to have aided founding families that were attempting to withdraw 
from active management of  their businesses and to diversify their holdings 
(Atack 1985; Chandler 1990). 
Chandler (1990) draws a sharp contrast between wide share ownership dis- 
tributed  by  investment banks  and  salaried managers in  Germany  and  the 
United States, and the more “personal capitalism” in which founding families 
preserve substantial equity stakes and managerial positions that prevailed in 
Great Britain.28  Yet  he also downplays the role of investment banks, especially 
in the United States where the partnerships were very small business organi- 
zations and large deposit banks played a minor role (see White 1983 and 1989; 
Burr 1927). It may be that investment banks played a key role in allowing 
founding families to transform their corporations into the professionally man- 
aged organizations with diversified stock ownership that were to dominate the 
twentieth century. Founding families may have been unwilling to sell out and 
retire from the business unless they could get a fair price. Without a J.  P. 
Morgan to implicitly warrant their property, obtaining a “fair” price from the 
founding family’s perspective may have been difficult. It is possible to specu- 
late that turn-of-the-century finance capitalists played an important role in cat- 
alyzing the development of the managerial hierarchies whose importance is 
stressed by Chandler (  1990). 
The relative industrial success of Germany, Japan, and Gilded Age United 
States has its counterpoint in the relative industrial decline of  turn-of-the- 
century Great Britain. As Lewis (1978, 130) puts it, at the end of  the nine- 
teenth century “organic chemicals became a German industry; the motor car 
was  pioneered  in  France and  mass-produced in  the United  States; Britain 
lagged in the use of electricity, depended on foreign firms established there, 
and took only a small share of the export market. The telephone, the type- 
writer, the cash register, and the diesel engine were all exploited by others.” 
Industry after technologically sophisticated industry in which one would have 
expected British industry, by virtue of Britain’s larger industrial base and head 
start, to have a strong position was dominated by  producers from other, fol- 
lower countries. 
28. For an insider’s view of the pattern of investment banking relationships under such a system 
of  “personal capitalism,’’  see O’Hagan (1929). 230  J. Bradford De Long 
Alongside Britain’s relative industrial decline went a tremendous surge of 
capital exports. In 1913 Great Britain’s net interests, profits, and dividends 
from overseas investment amounted to 9.3 percent of gross domestic product. 
Accumulated balance-of-payments surplus over 1885-19 13 amounted to per- 
haps 22,620 million-1  10 percent of  1913 gross domestic product. Nominal 
net overseas assets are equal to the sum of  accumulated  surplus, the initial 
position, unrealized (real) capital gains, and inflation, and so may well have 
been much larger than accumulated surplus. Britain in 1913 had considerably 
more than an entire year’s gross output invested abroad, and its net overseas 
assets may well have exceeded its total net domestic stock of  reproducible 
capital. 
Riesser criticized the pre-World  War I organization of British banking and 
finance because it lacked an equivalent to the monitoring system performed 
by the industrial cliques in Japan, the great banks in Germany, and the Morgan 
partners in the United States. He argued that the “complete divorce between 
stock exchange and deposits . . . causes another great evil, namely, that the 
banks have never shown any interest in the newly founded companies or in 
the securities issued by these companies, while it is a distinct advantage of the 
German system, that the German banks, even if only in the interests of their 
own issue credit, have been keeping a continuous watch over the development 
of the companies, which they founded (Riesser 191  1, 555). 
It is possible to speculate that Britain’s surge of overseas investment, its 
relative industrial decline, and its absence of financial capitalist institutions 
all go together. If  “financial capitalist” institutions did in fact play the role in 
guiding and warranteeing investments that I have argued they played, the ab- 
sence of such institutions in Britain may have been a factor contributing to its 
anomalous combination of healthy  domestic savings with  anemic domestic 
investment, large overseas investments, and relative industrial decline. Rela- 
tive industrial decline in Britain may have played a part in leading financial 
capitalists to focus their energies elsewhere. J.  P.  Morgan’s father spent at 
least  as much  time working in London  as in New York.  The causal chain 
seems likely to run in both directions-finance  capitalism may help econo- 
mies grow fast, and fast-growing economies may develop “finance capitalist” 
institutions-and  which direction is the stronger is an open question.29 
6.7.2  The Decline of Financial Capitalism in the United States 
Perhaps the  Morgan-dominated “finance capitalist”  pattern  of  the  1900s 
was peculiar to that age, and subsequent changes-chiefly  the wider diffusion 
29. This line of criticism has been taken up and amplified by many who have seen the financial 
centers in the City of London as having failed industry. For example,  see Ronald Dore (1987). 
The argument was originally made by Lance Davis (1963). Today (as in the past) the Deutsche 
Bank votes the shares of many German stockholders, stockholders presumably believing that the 
bank will do a better job of voting their shares than they would. 231  Did Morgan’s Men Add Value? 
of  available information to individual stockholders-have  eroded the infor- 
mational advantage of  financiers that  sustained “finance capitalism” in  the 
early years of this century. Perhaps the history of U.S. financial markets in the 
twentieth century should be written as a history of  how  informational and 
technological changes drive organizational shifts.  Perhaps as the twentieth 
century passed, the importance of private information declined, the ability of 
investors to do their own security analysis grew, and managers’ compensation 
schemes  placed  greater  weight  on  stock  options  and  were  more  closely 
aligned with shareholders’ interests. In this case it would not be surprising if 
the service of monitoring managers provided by  Morgan and Company be- 
came worth less and less as the century passed. 
Yet  there is reason to doubt such an interpretation. Historical accounts of 
the erosion of financial capitalism in the first half of the twentieth century have 
not focused on informational and technological changes that made J. P.  Mor- 
gan obsolete.30  Instead, historical accounts emphasize relatively autonomous 
political events and psychological shifts in the attitudes of small investors to- 
ward the stock market. As historians like Sobel (1965) see it, the first stage in 
Morgan’s impending decline came in the aftermath of the World War I door- 
to-door bond  selling campaigns,  as Charles Mitchell of  the National  City 
Bank came to recognize that a financial empire does not have to be built by 
slowly creating a reputation as a shrewd judge of investments but can be built 
through  direct  salesmanship by  uninformed  representatives (Peach  1941 ; 
Cowing 1965; Huertas and Cleveland 1987). 
The second stage is the popularization of the benefits of common stock 
ownership during the  1920s (as urged,  for example, by  Smith  1924). The 
belief that everyone should invest in common stocks, coupled with Mitchell’s 
high-pressure sales campaigns and the growing possibility that the New Era 
might really be a new era of permanent prosperity, helped fuel the stock boom 
of the 1920s and made Morgan’s or Kuhn, Loeb’s willingness to stand behind 
a security issue no longer of prime importance. Many investors were willing 
to bet along with Samuel Insull that he was a financial genius even without 
Morgan’s or Kuhn, Loeb’s implicit warranty. 
The third stage in the decline of “financial capitalism” saw the creation of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission and the forcible divorce of bankers 
who had the capital to take substantial long-term positions in firms from their 
30. Another reason to doubt such an  interpretation is that  much current thinking in finance 
argues that the conflict of interest between owners and managers is still a central feature of finance 
today. Jensen’s (1989) admittedly extreme estimate of these gains in the last decade pegs them as 
worth more than half of the total cash dividends paid by the corporate sector. It is possible to argue 
that informational and technological changes gradually made “financial capitalism”  and an active 
market for control obsolete in the first half of this century. It is more difficult to argue that such 
changes made “financial capitalism” obsolete in the first half of this century, and that subsequent 
changes in information and technology have made “financial capitalism” viable once again in the 
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places on boards of directors from which they could easily monitor manage- 
rial performance (Seligman 1982). 
This story, traditionally told by  historians, is not a story of  a shift in the 
balance of  information flows, or in the form of  the efficient organization of 
the relationship between finance and industry. The SEC took the form that it 
did largely because the populists in Congress had always believed in Unter- 
myer’s and Brandeis’s critiques of how the bankers used other people’s money, 
not because Untermyer’s and Brandeis’s critiques had suddenly become more 
correct than they had been in 1910 (ibid. 1982). The Glass-Steagall Act was 
passed because of the Great Depression, not because of an increase in ultimate 
investors’ ability to assess and monitor firms. And organizations like the Na- 
tional City Bank and, later, Merrill Lynch appear to have prospered not be- 
cause they were the best judges of  the worth of  securities, but because their 
door-to-door methods were able to directly tap savings that would otherwise 
have flowed into the life insurance and banking systems, and would presum- 
ably have reached the capital market in the hands of more sophisticated money 
managers. 
6.8  Conclusions 
Many issues have not been addressed.  Surely the most  important unad- 
dressed issue is the balance between J. P.  Morgan’s adding shareholder value 
by improving efficiency as opposed to by creating monopoly. This question is 
close to unresolvable. No one disputes that the robber barons sought monop- 
oly; no one disputes that the robber barons took advantage of  economies of 
scale. The relative weight to be given these two factors is very hard to assess. 
And in no case is the evidence strong enough to convincingly overcome prior 
beliefs of as much strength as historians typically hold on this issue. 
This paper, however, has addressed one major element of  the Progressive 
critique of the turn-of-the-century organization of American finance: that fin- 
anciers’ presence on corporate boards of directors allowed them to impose an 
unwarranted tax on industry by exploiting for their own benefit conflicts of 
interest. The Progressives’ fear was well founded: there were conflicts of  in- 
terest, and investment bankers did exploit them. But there is also evidence 
that from shareholders’ and owners’ standpoints these negatives of  financial 
capitalism were outweighed by positives. 
This paper has also pointed out a substantial lacuna in finance historians’ 
interpretations of turn-of-the-century Wall  Street. Historians of  finance have 
argued that the Morgan partnership was subject to the discipline of the market, 
yet they have not explained how active competition is consistent with the very 
high profits achieved by Morgan and Company. The answer is that the market 
did not discipline the Morgan partnership in the short run: Morgan and Com- 
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from going to another investment banker. But the market did discipline the 
Morgan partnership in the long run: the only reason that Morgan and Com- 
pany were able to keep doing deals and charging high fees was their reputation 
for good judgment and for giving the ultimate investors in  their deals good 
value. Preservation of this reputation was the primary goal of the partnership 
and left it with little room to abuse its short-run market power by leading its 
clients into unsound deals. 
In general, a strong argument in economics rests on three supports: First 
comes a coherent theoretical base laying out the strategies available to and the 
interests of market participants. Second is concrete evidence that actual indi- 
vidual investors, managers, and bankers understood and acted according to 
the theoretical logic of the situation. And third comes statistical evidence that 
such a pattern of action is found not just in isolated anecdotes but is standard 
operating procedure in the situation. 
In this paper the theoretical logic for interpreting Morgan’s edge in terms of 
its hard-to-match reputation as an honest broker and a skillful analyst of risk 
is clear. Many observers at the time thought that the stamp of  approval of 
Morgan and Company was worth its handsome price and gave confidence. 
And the large-scale correlation between “finance capitalist” relationships and 
rapid growth remains intriguing and suggestive. The third support is slightly 
weaker: there were relatively few Morgan-influenced companies on the eve of 
World War I, including both successes and disasters. It is not possible to ob- 
tain precise estimates of the quantitative value of the Morgan touch, but it is 
highly likely that it was valuable and that Morgan’s influence led to corpora- 
tions that made higher profits. 
Since the decline of  the House of  Morgan, concern over the relationship 
between finance and industry in America has centered on two themes. The 
first is the concern expressed by Berle and Means (1932) that corporate man- 
agers had become accountable to no one and would divert corporate wealth 
and  assets to their own selfish purposes. The second is the fear that today 
investment projects are assessed not by far-seeing investment bankers with a 
keen sense of  fundamentals but by  an erratic and flighty stock market com- 
mitted to the short term. In Keynes’s (1936, 160) words: “The spectacle of 
modern investment markets has sometimes moved me towards the conclusion 
that to make the purchase of an investment permanent and indissoluble, like a 
marriage, except for reason of death or other grave cause, might be a useful 
remedy for our contemporary evils. For this would force the investor to direct 
his mind to the long-term prospects and to those only.” Both of these ills seem 
to call for large-scale financial institutions to take an interest in  firm man- 
agement by  establishing and holding large long-term positions in individual 
companies. It  is  an  irony that today many of  the intellectual children and 
grandchildren of the Progressives appear to call for a return to “financial cap- 
italism.” 234  J. Bradford De Long 
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Comment  Charles F.  Sabel 
In the spirit of  this conference, De Long’s ingenious effort to show that J. P. 
Morgan and Company served the interests of the investing public and its cor- 
porate clients while blocking competitors from sharing its rich fees marks the 
shift of intellectual perspective from Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.’s, Harvard Busi- 
ness School history of the corporation to what might precipitously be called 
the New Cambridge Business History. What both schools have in common is 
the intention to show that even those powerful economic institutions of Gilded 
Age America, which Populists and Progressives believed had dangerously es- 
caped the control of  competition, were subject to a  higher  discipline.  For 
both, this discipline put pursuit of self-interest in the service of the economy 
as a whole. 
Where they differ, profoundly, is in their understanding  of  how this disci- 
pline  worked.  Chandler  focuses  on  the  way  the  efficient  use  of  mass- 
production  and  continuous-process technologies,  manifest  particularly  in 
economies of scale, governed the construction and extension of the industrial 
corporation. Bankers are so far removed from the formative influence of pro- 
duction technology  that they can play only a subordinate part in his history, 
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except when (as in the notorious case of U.S. Steel) they or their representa- 
tives  foolishly interfere with  managers’ pursuit of  the  economies of  high 
throughput production. 
De Long reflects, in contrast, the temper of  the new intellectual times. For 
his generation of historians, technology is at least as malleable as constrain- 
ing. Managers may be professionals, but they have selfish interests that can 
endanger even their own organizations. He is concerned, therefore, with the 
way the resolution of problems of corporate governance, and especially prin- 
cipals’ problems in controlling their agents, form economic institutions that 
would  not  exist  in  a  perfectly competitive world.  He  is drawn,  naturally 
enough, to the study of investment banking as an archetypal case, because the 
same informational advantages that make an investment bank attractive to its 
customers invite the bankers to self-dealing and deception. De Long’s central 
argument is that a reputation for honesty, which could only be acquired slowly 
but lost in a careless or deceitful flash, protected J. P.  Morgan against compet- 
itive challenges. It also protected the firm’s customers against abuses of  its 
dominant market position. A closer look at this argument offers an occasion 
for noting some of the opportunities, but also the risks, presented by the ap- 
plication of ideas drawn from the new information economics to a fundamen- 
tal problem of business history. 
The following comment is in four parts. The first considers De Long’s con- 
tention that Morgan did good by its clients and the investing public. It stipu- 
lates that, although De Long’s arguments are even more dubious than he con- 
cedes, there is still sufficient evidence of respect of others’ interests to justify 
curiosity about the question, Why didn’t Morgan cheat (more)? The second 
argues that an explanation based on any straightforward interpretation of  the 
restraining powers of a reputation for reliability is contradicted by  the pres- 
ence of two conspicuously rotten business deals in De Long’s small universe 
of  Morgan firms, and that his efforts to explain away the discrepancy as a 
statistical artifact only make the incongruities more evident. Closer examina- 
tion of the two bad deals suggests that J. P.  Morgan and Company did value 
its reputation for sound performance, but that the meaning of that concern 
cannot be grasped by reputation models of corporate behavior that presume 
that the problems of economic coordination are principally problems of judg- 
ing the trustworthiness of potential partners. 
The third section, therefore, sketches an alternative view of  Morgan and 
Company as a maker of the market for companies-an  institution, that is, that 
shaped the conditions under which  industrial assets could be  recombined. 
This view arguably explains everything explained by  the reputation model, 
including the importance of the firm’s reputation to its success. But it explains 
as well the failure of Morgan’s business fiascoes to produce the catastrophic 
results that the reputation model anticipates. Sketchy as it is, this alternative 
view calls attention to the large class of  barriers to entry and restraints on 
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establishing a reliable way of  signaling trustworthiness. Furthermore, it sug- 
gests how to address a question obscured by the reputation view: How do the 
different ways equally trustworthy makers of  markets in corporate control go 
about their business affect the industrial organization that result? 
In a world of manifestly imperfect markets but growing (if unequally dis- 
tributed) wealth, it is tempting to explain material advances by  identifying a 
mechanism that yokes those with economic power to block progress to the 
cart of productive efficiency. In the age of  mass production, technologically 
determined economies of  scale turned this  trick for the Harvard Business 
School historians (and Karl Marx). In an age that seems to require more and 
more collaboration within and among firms, regardless of  size, it is easy to 
suspect that the need to acquire and protect a reputation for trustworthiness as 
a precondition for competitive survival could play a similar disciplinary role. 
The concluding part offers, by  way  of summary, some reasons for historians 
of business to resist this and analogous temptations. 
Who Benefited from Morgan and Company’s Services? 
If  the  Progressives were right and  Morgan and Company prospered by 
abusing its economic power, De Long has nothing to explain. Hence his first 
step is to put the lie to the Progressive view.  But even leaving aside the un- 
doubtedly important effects of the firm’s international financial activities, and 
taking the partners’ rewards for granted, it is hard to know how wide a net to 
cast in assessing the firm’s performance. An expansive interpretation would 
assume that  Morgan  and  Company played  a decisive role in  shaping the 
American railroad and steel industries. An  assessment of  the firm’s effects 
would then require an evaluation of its part in the rise and subsequent decline 
of these industries. A restrictive interpretation would treat Morgan and Com- 
pany as the provider of specialized financial and consultant services to large 
corporations. An assessment of the firm’s role could then be limited to con- 
trasting the performance of the firm’s most important clients with the perform- 
ance of  a comparable but unaffiliated group of  corporations. Insofar as the 
limited  finding that  Morgan clients outperformed other, similar companies 
would be sufficient to discomfit the Progressives, De Long reasonably enough 
concentrates the second and more tractable evaluation. Later, however,  we 
will see that there is a price to pay for his cursory consideration of the first. 
Thus De Long compares the  stock market  performances in  1911-12  of 
twenty companies-three  utilities, nine railroads, and eight others-whose 
boards of directors included J. P.  Morgan or one of  his partners, with sixty- 
two firms of  similar size that had not been “Morganized.” He finds that the 
ratio of the market value of a firm’s common stock to its book value is about 
30 percent higher in Morganized companies than in the unaffiliated ones. This 
price premium is explained in his estimation by  the Morgan firms’ superior 
rates of earnings measured as a percentage of book value. “To the extent that 
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companies they monitored more profitable.” If the performance of the worst- 
performing company is-implausibly,  as we shall see-discounted,  then it 
appears further that at any given level of profitability investors were willing to 
pay an additional premium for Morgan stocks, presumably because they ex- 
pected the earnings of  such companies to be more secure or to grow faster 
than those of other equally profitable ones. Finally, the average nominal rates 
of return on the stock of Morganized companies between 1895 (or the year, if 
later, in which a Morgan director went on the client’s boards) and 1913 corre- 
spond to the average rates of return of the market as a whole during that period 
as gauged by standard indices. 
Here I want to enter two of many possible qualifications to these claims. 
First, as De Long notes at least three times, it is impossible to determine from 
his calculations the extent to which Morganized companies achieved superior 
profitability by exploiting monopoly power that their very formation created, 
rather than by achieving efficiency gains. In many cases typical of the period, 
furthermore, it will be extremely difficult to distinguish those sources of prof- 
itability without undertaking a detailed study of the particular industries and 
firms at issue. Given economies of scale, the creation of optimally sized pro- 
duction units may require just  the kind of  concentration of  ownership that 
clears the way to extraction of monopoly rents; and once a firm has the possi- 
bility of pursuing either strategy, its actual course of action, as the history of 
U.S.  Steel shows,’ depends on the managers’ ideas of  “fair” competition, 
their expectations regarding the behavior of regulatory authorities, and their 
concepts of efficiency. 
Second, it turns out to be no easier to say precisely what Morganization was 
than to say what effects it produced. Was inclusion of a Morgan partner on a 
company’s board  a  necessary  and  sufficient condition for  Morganization? 
What about firms that hired Morgan and Company to underwrite their securi- 
ties, but neither chose nor were obliged to offer a directorship to one of the 
firm’s partners? Is their performance distinguishable from that of corporations 
where Morgan direction was more direct? Or take those instances, which De 
Long hints at in a footnote (note 20), where Morgan partners served on boards 
together with partners from other leading investment banks. Were these Mor- 
ganized in the same way as the others? Did their stocks command a premium 
because two absolutely trustworthy monitors were on the scene? Or did the 
presence of rival groups signal the potential for expensive struggles for con- 
trol? Or, finally, is it possible to distinguish the performance of Morganized 
firms in which Morgan directors played an active role (as at International Har- 
vester and A.T.  & T.) from those-and  there surely must have been some- 
where the Morgan presence was merely nominal? Perhaps American investors 
only took notice of an investment bank’s possible influence on company per- 
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formance when a Morgan partner went on the company’s board, and whenever 
one of Morgan’s men did so, he monitored with alacrity. But it would be nice 
to know this, or know it cannot be ascertained. 
These two lines of  criticism strike me as damaging to De Long’s project 
only if he is supposed to be undertaking an estimation of the beneficial effect 
of  investment banking on the U.S. economy in the decade before World War 
I. If, as I think is plainly nearer the truth, his aim is to show that J. P. Morgan 
and his clients made surprisingly little use of  their undoubted power to bilk 
the (stock-owning) public, then neither the problem of distinguishing monop- 
oly from efficiency gains nor the broad-bush treatment of Morganization con- 
stitute unsurmountable objections, and we are obliged to examine De Long’s 
explanation of their restraint. 
Reputations and Fiascoes 
The essence of De Long’s explanation of  Morgan’s prosperous restraint is 
the idea that some kinds of  success can be a safeguard against excess and a 
defense against imitation. The relevant example is a reputation for reliability 
or trustworthiness, hard to acquire because no one will entrust a party without 
such a reputation with a task that supposes trust; but the only way to build the 
reputation is to execute such tasks in a trustworthy way. The long, slow way 
out of this trap, as De Long suggests in his rksumt of Morgan and Company’s 
origins (note 18), is to demonstrate such able fidelity in the execution of mod- 
est assignments that the next client will be reassured enough by the perform- 
ance to offer riskier work, and so on. Once acquired, finally, the reputation is 
so valuable that it will not be jeopardized for the gains of any single deception. 
Seen this way,  it is easy to understand how Morgan and Company, which 
traded on trust, became a prisoner of  what could theoretically have been  a 
calculating display of honesty. Because the reputation was costly to acquire, 
it constituted a barrier to entry for potential competitors, and it was this barrier 
that protected Morgan’s extraordinary fees and his control of a dominant mar- 
ket  position.  Modem  historians of  finance such  as  Carosso  are  therefore 
wrong to think that competition among investment banks rendered talk of  a 
“money trust” a polemical, Progressive exaggeration. But because this same 
reputation was worthless if abused, Morgan actually had to deliver value for 
money, and here the Progressive view that the money trust answered only to 
itself is also incorrect. 
This view has three things going for it. It breaks an intellectual stalemate 
by  establishing new stylized facts-there  was a money trust in the sense of 
dominant forms with indubitable power over their clients, but not in the sense 
of uncontrolled conspiracy-and  reconciles them with elegant analytic cate- 
gories. In  doing this,  it recasts debate in a way  that reveals deep affinities 
between the new theory and the views of informed contemporaries. An early 
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contains the core of the reputation model.* Better yet, the same categories that 
break an intellectual logjam and reestablish more intimate contact with views 
of key actors also respond to the hopeful promptings of our own times to find 
a mechanism that disciplines self-interest in the absence of  (nearly) perfect 
competition or technological constraints. 
Take it as a sign of  pessimism of the intellect and without for the moment 
further theoretical justification that I believe any theory that good is too good 
to be true. In this case, at any rate, I am convinced that it is. The reason is 
simply that, as De Long himself notes, two of the twenty Morganized forms 
were  extremely  unsuccessful.  Indeed  they  were  in  principle unsuccessful 
enough to ruin the value of the firm’s reputation-if,  as De Long asserts, that 
reputation was the equivalent of a performance bond, and hence forfeit if the 
company did not perform. 
Both of the failures were notorious in their time. The first was the Interna- 
tional Mercantile Marine Company (IMM), more commonly called the Mor- 
gan shipping trust. It was formed in 1902 under Morgan’s direction, through 
the combination of various British and American shipping lines in association 
with several German carriers also active on the North Atlantic route. The com- 
bine never came close to meeting its bankers’ expectation that it would con- 
solidate and extend its grip on the growing passenger and freight traffic be- 
tween Europe and the United States. Among many other problems, Morgan 
had not foreseen that, when transport was by sea rather than by rail, unsched- 
uled or tramp carriers could enter the trade whenever demand picked up, forc- 
ing the scheduled shippers to leave port with empty cargo space even in good 
times. Morgan, moreover, allowed the IMM to pay exorbitant prices for its 
constituent  properties;  the  firm’s  disappointing  revenues  therefore  went 
mostly to service its fixed debt, with next to nothing left for the owners of its 
common sto~k.~  That stock lost on average one-quarter of the previous year’s 
value each year during the decade before World War I. 
The second failure was the b&te  noire of  the Progressives: the New York, 
New Haven, and Hartford Railroad. J. P.  Morgan was native to Hartford, and 
his family had been associated with the road’s predecessor lines for genera- 
tions before he was elected to the company’s board in 1891. His original inten- 
tion may have been to simply establish an orderly partition of market shares 
between the New Haven and its northern competitor, the Boston and Maine. 
But by  1903, when he helped  secure Charles Mellen’s appointment as the 
New  Haven president,  he had become enamored of the idea of  creating an 
integrated regional transport system, including not only the Boston and Maine 
but also coastal steamship lines and interurban electric trollies. It was  Mel- 
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len’s ruthless acquisition of a 36 percent interest in the Boston and Maine in 
1907 that began the long feud between Louis Brandeis-the  most sophisti- 
cated of the Progressives-and  the Morgan interests. But it was the exorbitant 
price that Mellen paid for his new properties (and the bribes required to facil- 
itate their sale) that brought the grand plan to fall. From  1903 to  1913, the 
road’s bonded debt alone increased from $14 million to an insupportable $242 
million. By  1913, in fact, the board of directors forced Mellen to resign. But 
by  then the railroad was so strapped for cash that maintenance of  track and 
rolling stock was reduced below acceptable standards. After a long series of 
widely publicized accidents, which further enraged its critics, deeply embar- 
rassed the Morgan banks, and alarmed its ridership, the firm omitted its divi- 
dend in December of that year.4 
If investors bought the stocks of Morganized companies on the basis of the 
reputation model of investment banking, then the failure of these two compa- 
nies should have caused them to sell all of  their stocks. Either Morgan and 
Company was ignorant of management’s missteps and excesses as the partners 
claimed with respect to Mellen’s more lurid activities. But then Morgan and 
Company was  negligent in  its responsibility to monitor the behavior of  its 
clients. Or the firm connived with  management in  operations that put  the 
bank’s interests ahead of not only stockholders but many of its business part- 
ners as well. But if  Morgan and  Company felt secure enough behind the 
screen of its reputation to cheat even once, why should it not cheat again and 
again? Reputations will not  serve as barriers to entry or restraint on self- 
dealing if they can be spotted without being ruined. 
De Long is plainly at loose ends with respect to the cases. His inclination, 
in effect, is to explain away the IMM case by  reestimating the Morgan effect 
on stock prices with nonparametric tests that discount outliers. But the whole 
point of reputations in business as he defines them is that they are supposed to 
insure against the occurrence of (negative) outliers. Evading the problem only 
calls attention to it. 
Facing the fiascoes squarely, on the contrary, shows in  my  view that the 
difficulties in De Long’s explanation of the Morgans’ success are in the partic- 
ular model of reputation he applies, not in the deeper intuition that trust and 
reputation plays an important part in explaining the firm’s behavior. In fact, 
what is most surprising about the fiascoes, other than that they occurred at all, 
is that most of Morgan and Company’s mistakes were honest mistakes-mis- 
judgments about business conditions rather than efforts to deceive-and  that 
the firm went to considerable lengths to limit the losses that resulted. As an 
example of an honest misjudgment, take the matter of  overpayment for the 
constituent properties,  a  consideration in  both  the IMM  and  New  Haven 
cases. The purchase prices reflected expectations about the growth rates of 
future earnings, as was commonly (and reasonably) the case. When earnings 
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grew at the expected rate, as in the case of U.S. Steel, things went well, when 
not, then not. But Morgan’s two disastrous predictions arguably resulted from 
a mindless extrapolation of past experience in the railroad and other indus- 
tries: witness the failure to anticipate the effects of new entrants such as tramp 
steamers and later automobiles5  into markets that the firm wanted to dominate 
through control of existing properties. If  there was deception here, it was as 
much self-deception as anything else. With regard to the limitation of losses, 
consider the example of the complex financing of $45 million of New Haven 
debt, which Morgan undertook at an indeterminate risk to itself and which 
alone prevented the road from failing or being placed in receivership. Or note 
that prominent Morgan directors remained on the board of the IMM and con- 
tinued their efforts to make success of the venture until 1932, when, as world 
trade collapsed, the bank severed its ties with the company.6 
Morgan and Company was thus very concerned to protect its reputation for 
reliability and integrity, even when its reputation defined as a performance 
bond was forfeit. Why? One way to respond to that question without abandon- 
ing the reputation model on  which De Long’s essay is based would be  to 
define more precisely to whom the bank considered itself as owing its reputa- 
tion, and how that obligation had to be honored. This means elaborating the 
view of the bank as an honest broker or-stretching  the point in a way that 
De Long frequently does-honest  monitor, balancing the needs of its custom- 
ers and the investing public.  It could be defined instead as, say, a reliable 
member of the club of financial intermediaries, answerable above all to fellow 
members. In that case, stock prices might fall without doing irreparable dam- 
age to the firm’s reputation, but outright failure of one of its companies, in- 
cluding significant write-offs of  bonded debt, would. I believe that the more 
such a notion is elaborated, the closer it comes to a plausible view of all the 
stylized facts-including  now the fact of  failure-in  which reputation turns 
out to be  a necessary but insufficient condition for explaining Morgan and 
Company’s success. But that is the long way around. The next part starts with 
a sketch of this more comprehensive view and then distinguishes it from the 
core idea of the reputation model, however elaborated. 
Morgan and Company as Market Makers 
Economic historians usually know,  even if  economists often do not, that 
markets do not arise spontaneously. The background rules of exchange, such 
as contract law or the rules governing liability, as well as the distribution and 
meaning of control over property, depend on the cumulative outcome of inter- 
minable conflicts particular to each economy. Where, as in the advanced cap- 
italist countries, markets have long existed, however, the emergence of  the 
most  fundamental rules  of  exchange appears so inevitable and those rules 
5. Ibid., 389. 
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change so slowly and with such an air of self-evidence that markets appear to 
create themselves. 
To make a market in the sense I intend here is a more deliberate act. It is to 
create and maintain orderly conditions under which controls over assets of 
particular kinds can be exchanged and combined in novel ways. Market mak- 
ing in this sense depends on and may require elaboration of the background 
rules of exchange in a particular economy. But (assuming that all transactions 
are voluntary) it also depends on the capacity to imagine some way in which 
redeployment of assets would make at least some parties to the exchange bet- 
ter off  while worsening the condition of  none.  Those who make markets, 
therefore, must be able to value assets in various conditions and discover how 
to redeploy them in the most valued way. 
What I want to suggest is that Morgan and Company achieved its dominant 
position in U.S. banking by making a market in the control of transportation 
and industrial companies, that the power to make such markets depended on 
respect for boundary conditions on the outcomes of market transactions and 
was in this sense self-limiting, and that a reputation for integrity was a neces- 
sary but far from sufficient condition for the exercise of this power. J. P.  Mor- 
gan and his partners seem to have glimpsed the possibilities of  this role and 
acquired the expertise to exploit it during the 1880s as they pursued the fami- 
ly’s established business of selling American railroad securities to investors in 
the United States and Great Britain. By the beginning of that decade, Morgan 
was  abandoning the earlier strategy of  financing only well-established rail- 
roads,’ and underwriting the debt for the construction or completion of  “un- 
built” roads, whose value fluctuated depending on changing estimates of the 
costs, progress, and probable returns of  the work-in-progress as well as the 
general condition of the financial markets. To  manage these risks the firm had 
to learn to use its own resources and syndicates of underwriters, which it rap- 
idly formed to buffer securities in roads such as the Oregon and Transconti- 
nental against market turmoil.* The new expertise in the management of the 
securities markets drew the firm by  middecade into the reorganization of 
bankrupt or faltering lines. As in the case of the Philadelphia and Reading in 
1886, these restructurings required creation of the usual financial apparatus, 
the careful assessment of the road’s affiliated properties (coal in this instance), 
and renegotiation of  its leases on connecting lines. But also and more impor- 
tantly, the restructuring created an agreement with the road’s chief competitor 
(the Pennsylvania Railroad) to divide traffic in the region so as to “maintain 
paying rates,” organization of an anthracite coal pool to stabilize prizes in that 
industry, and formation of a three-man committee (effectively headed by Mor- 
gan) representing the five-year voting trust that had final authority over man- 
agement’s decisions during the period of reorganization. The debt of the reor- 
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ganized  line  proved  easily  marketable  precisely  because  Morgan  and 
Company knew the road's  finances in detail and because key revenue flows 
had been rendered more predictable by  the reorganization itself. This experi- 
ence, together with the reorganizations of  the Baltimore and Ohio and the 
Chesapeake and Ohio in this same period must have confirmed what J.  P. 
Morgan plainly suspected: The reorganization  of companies was remunerative 
in itself and the ideal way to maintain a dominant position in the market for 
corporate securities. But the reorganization of  a company depended on the 
reorganization, in  whole  or  part,  of  its and  allied indu~tries.~  From here 
the industrial reorganizations of  the following decades were just around the 
corner, 
I underline three aspects of  this market-making activity in support of  the 
contention that it was self-disciplining and created barriers to entry that in- 
cluded but were not limited to a reputation for integrity and reliability. First, 
the vast possibilities for self-dealing inherent in market making were checked 
at least in  part by  the obligation of  reorganized companies to service their 
bonded debt. If Morgan and Company tolerated overpayment for the constit- 
uent properties of the new combines, whether because of greed or because of 
good-faith misjudgment of  their potential profitability, then, as we saw, this 
could be detected and penalized by the financial markets. The Morgan power 
to reorganize firms opened the door to great riches, but as the frantic efforts of 
equivalent modem investment bankers such as Kohlberg, Kravitz, and Rob- 
erts to keep debt service on their companies current reminds us, it is not  a 
license to steal. Morgan, recall, became an expert in industrial reorganization 
by first becoming an expert in the reorganization of  bankrupt railroads. If he 
could not  keep companies he created out of  bankruptcy, what was he good 
for? 
Second, the ability of  Morgan and Company to make a market in firms 
depended on possession of highly specialized kinds of knowledge and dispo- 
sition over diverse but complimentary resources, including political influence, 
all of which constituted barriers to entry into the market for corporate reorga- 
nization. To  envision corporate restructuring as Morgan and Company did 
was to imagine simultaneously not only redistribution of properties and the 
means of financing and redistribution but also a new market order and a gov- 
ernance structure for monitoring it. To  evaluate assets, it was necessary to 
consider their use in different settings, which required imagination of  new 
governance structures, which required elaboration of  new kinds of  property, 
access to pools of capital, and so on. It was the combination of all these ca- 
pacities, not  any one alone, that I think allowed Morgan and Company to 
dominate the market for corporate reorganization. Participants in that market 
turned to the firm, it seems to me, not because it was more trustworthy than 
other securities dealers, but precisely because it could do things securities 
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dealers could  not-and  this  because  it  possessed,  as investment bankers 
would say today, a technology that the others lacked. To  see how specialized 
this technology was, recall the near disastrous results when Morgan and Com- 
pany applied it to new problems, as in  the case of  the IMM and the New 
Haven. If  it was dangerous for the leading maker of the market in corporate 
reorganization to move from one industry to another, imagine how forbidding 
it must have seemed to enter the general line of business in the first place. 
Third, to say this does not imply that a reputation for integrity did not also 
operate as a barrier to entry to the Morgan and Company’s field of operations 
or as a check on the firm’s dealings. I already noted that the firm was only as 
good as its ability to insure that Morganized companies serviced their debt, 
and in fact went to extraordinary lengths to avoid bankruptcies. My point is 
simply that a reputation for knowledgeable integrity alone leaves a lot unex- 
plained about Morgan and Company’s place in the banking industry. Indeed, 
it is only when that reputation is interpreted in the light of the partners’ widely 
acknowledged role as experts in corporate reorganization that the firm’s abil- 
ity to prosper despite the miserable performance of several Morganized com- 
mon  stocks becomes comprehensible. Morgan made companies, effectively 
warranted them against failure, and stood behind the warranty; and the secu- 
rities industry evidently knew it. But it could not make companies because it 
was or was reputed to be more trustworthy than its competitors, any more than 
it could have done so if it had a less savory reputation than they. 
For a Less Constraining View of Constraints in History 
As I noted at the outset, Chandler and De Long both intend to explain the 
general discipline that puts economic power to productive use when perfect 
competition does not.  For Chandler, the disciplinary mechanism is technol- 
ogy; for De Long, the need to acquire and maintain a reputation for trustwor- 
thiness. Here I want to extend and conclude the discussion by indicating how 
pursuit of such arguments, whatever their precise form, leads to a characteri- 
zation of  economic constraints that obstructs understanding of how different 
economies change in history. 
The difficulty is that, to be believable as a parsimonious explanation of 
constraint in any particular time or place, arguments of this type have to create 
the impression that they hold everywhere and always. They suggest, indeed, 
that economies will prosper to the extent that their institutions conform to the 
demands of  the alleged constraints; and insofar as  it also presumed-as  it 
typically  is-that  pursuit  of  individual  self-interest slowly pushes  whole 
economies in the direction of prosperous outcomes, views of this kind wind 
up suggesting that all industrial economies will adopt similar, efficiently con- 
strained forms of  organization. Chandler’s Scale and Scope, as well as his 
earlier project with Herman Daems,’O argues, for example, that successful 
10. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., and Herman Daems, Managerial  Hierarchies  (Cambridge:  Harvard 
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corporations in  industries with economies of  scale developed similar mana- 
gerial structures, first in the United States and then in Germany, France, and 
Great Britain. Analogously De Long argues that the superior long-term per- 
formance  of  economies-Germany,  Japan,  and  American  in  the  Gilded 
Age-monitored  by  “financial capitalist” institutions, such as the  Morgan 
bank, as compared to economies (Great Britain) that did not develop them is 
strong circumstantial evidence that those institutions contributed significantly 
to productive efficiency. His concluding remark that the intellectual “children 
and grandchildren” of the Progressives, and notably Lester Thurow, are dis- 
covering the virtues of a financial system that their doctrinal forebears reviled 
reinforces the impression that he believes “financial capitalism” to be a trans- 
historical-meaning  “right,” the  quotation marks  being,  in  this  case,  my 
doing-solution  to the problem of allocating capital in an  industrial market 
economy. 
One obvious shortcoming of this view is that it reduces the practically and 
theoretically pressing question of  why  some economies fail to develop the 
institutions needed to meet the highest competitive standards to the question, 
What noneconomic disturbances retarded growth? For if  by  assumption the 
creation of such institutions is the natural outcome of the individual pursuit of 
self-interest under the appropriate economic (market and technological) con- 
ditions, then only some exogenous, noneconomic perturbances can obstruct 
what Adam Smith called the “natural progress of opulence.”ll Thus Chandler 
follows Donald Coleman in explaining the failure of pre-World War I British 
firms to expand and move into new industries as the result of  management’s 
attachment to a gentlemanly disregard for growth, a “value” so strong and 
attractive that it dominated the behavior of even those managers who were not 
gentlemen. The failure of U.S. corporations to keep pace with their Japanese 
competitors is attributed to their unprecedented, imprudent,  and  implicitly 
fainthearted attempt to escape the growing international competition of  the 
1960s by  diversifying into unrelated businesses-attractive  because of  their 
high growth rates but so unfamiliar as to be treacherous to control-rather 
than defending their areas of core expertise.I2 In  the same spirit, De Long 
explains the destruction of  “financial capitalism” in the United States in the 
interwar years as the result of  a rise in populist sentiment in Congress, the 
panic created by the Great Depression, and the success of marginally scrupu- 
lous door-to-door salesmen of  stocks and bonds who “were able to directly 
tap savings that would otherwise have flowed into the life insurance and bank- 
ing systems, and would presumably have reached the capital market  in the 
hands of more sophisticated money managers .” What are economic historians 
doing if they spend half their time appealing to some aspect of high economic 
theory to explain why  things should go right and the other half pointing to 
things beyond the economy to explain why they do not? 
11. Adam Smith, The Wealth of  Nations (New York: Modem Library, (17761 1937), book 3, 
12. Chandler, Scale and Scope, 292,622. 
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A second, related shortcoming is that views of generally efficient and very 
constraining constraints make it impossible to pose, let alone answer, ques- 
tions about the ways the institutional embodiment of  a particular economic 
regime-“financial  capitalism”  or  mass  production-influence  the  subse- 
quent development of an economy. In the logic of  De Long’s argument, “fi- 
nancial capitalism” in Gilded Age America is theoretically indistinguishable 
from “financial capitalism” in pre-World  War  I Germany. Yet  there plainly 
were important differences between the two.  The forty-five employees of 
Morgan and Company had to steal time for monitoring from the time needed 
for deal making; and monitoring, perhaps predictably, got short shrift after the 
initial period of  reorganization.I3 The meandering policies of  U.  S. Steel- 
now putting a price umbrella over its competitors, now driving them to the 
wall through rationalization and cost cutting-is  the emblem of  the bank’s 
distant control. 
The Deutsche and other German great banks did notably more monitoring. 
For one thing, they themselves grew by  amalgamation with regional banks 
that had often grown up with the largest firms in their respective local econo- 
mies. For another, the great banks had so many industrial participations-as 
De Long observes, Deutsche directors alone sat on the boards of  159 compa- 
nies in  1912 (note 27)-that  their officials could become experts in the sub- 
stance of particular industries.14 
Perhaps, as seems likely to me, this difference had an effect. Perhaps differ- 
ences in monitoring had negligible effects on corporate structure. The only 
way  to decide is to take seriously the possibility that it might have. This re- 
quires regarding the bank not just as trustworthy, but as trustworthy at doing 
something in a particular setting. Following the earlier discussion of an alter- 
native view of the Morgan bank, this something might be making a market for 
the control of firms in Germany and the United States. The advantage of this 
formulation is that it captures the core constraints common to what might be 
called the property-transition regime specific to each country without making 
those constraints determinative of outcomes. Put another way,  an analysis of 
this kind makes it possible to avoid a fruitless distinction between universal 
compulsions and local, historical accidents without reducing economic his- 
tory to chronicle writing or sterile application of high theory. 
One of the great opportunities, as I see it, of the new economic information 
broadly understood is precisely to understand the way the views and strategies 
of the economic actors as structured by the economy’s manifold connection to 
13. Carosso, The Morgans, 486-87.  IMM was, significantly, the exception. Here the partners 
continued to watch matters closely, although to little effect (ibid., 486,491). 
14. J. Riesser, The German Great Banks and Their Concentration in Connection with the Eco- 
nomic Development of  Germany (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 191 1); Martin 
Gehr, “Das Verhaltnis zwischen Banken und Industrie in Deutschland seit Mitte das 19. Jahrhun- 
dert bis zur Bankenkrise von 1931 unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung  des industriellen Grosskre- 
dits,” inaugural diss., Faculty of  Law and Economics, Eberhard-Karls-Universitat  zu Tiibingen, 
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political and social life shape economic outcomes-and,  I cannot help add- 
ing, vice versa. Stopping short of that will mean merely reproducing old re- 
sults and old statements in new language. Because, like De Long, the New 
Cambridge Business Historians are drawn by the aesthetic of theoretical par- 
simony yet alive to the historicity of economic development, they can play an 
important part in making sure that the occasion is not lost. I suspect that in the 
end their reputation will depend not least on their success in that. This Page Intentionally Left Blank